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BERRY v. H.R. BEAL & SONS11/9/1994
Thurman Berry appeals from a decision of the Appellate Division of the Workers' Compensation Commission, which affirmed the Commissioner's decision that, pursuant to 39 M.R.S.A. § 62-B (1989), the employer's insurer was entitled to reduce Berry's workers' compensation benefits by an amount equal to fifty percent of his social security retirement benefits. Berry argues that (1) the application of section 62-B violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Maine and federal constitutions and (2) the employer's insurer is not entitled to the entire offset because one of the injuries responsible for his incapacity occurred before the effective date of section 62-B. We disagree and affirm the decision of the Commission.
Thurman Berry worked in the lobster business for H.R. Beal & Sons for about twenty years. In June 1977, he suffered a significant work-related injury to his lower back. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company
In 1983, at the age of sixty-three, Berry retired and began receiving social security retirement benefits. Because these benefits were not "enough to keep going," he later returned to work at H.R. Beal & Sons for about five hours per day. In August 1990, Berry suffered a second work-related
In September 1990, H.R. Beal & Sons and Commercial Union filed a petition for apportionment alleging that the June 1977 injury was partially responsible for Berry's total incapacity. By agreement of the parties, the Commissioner was also asked to determine the extent to which the responsible insurer could offset Berry's social security benefits pursuant to 39 M.R.S.A. § 62-B.
The Commissioner granted the petition for apportionment, finding that the 1977 and 1990 injuries were each fifty percent responsible for Berry's incapacity, concluded that Berry's workers' compensation benefits were subject to the entire offset provided for in section 62-B, and deducted $57 from his weekly compensation award. Berry's appeal to the Appellate Division was denied, and we granted his petition for review.
I. Equal Protection
Every act of the Legislature is presumed to be constitutional. Brann v. State, 424 A.2d 699, 703 (Me. 1981). Because Berry's equal protection challenge does not involve a suspect classification or fundamental right, the challenged classification need only be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." McNicholas v. York Beach Village Corp., 394 A.2d 264, 268 (Me. 1978) (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516-17, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976)). "One who assails the classification . . . must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." State Dep't of Transportation v. National Advertising Co., 387 A.2d 745, 750 (Me. 1978) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340-41, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911)). Whether a particular enactment is the best way to achieve the desired result is a matter for the Legislature, and not this Court. Peters v. Saft, 597 A.2d 50, 52 (Me. 1991).
Title 39 M.R.S.A. § 62-B provides in pertinent part as follows:
3. Coordination of benefits. Benefit payments subject to this
section shall be reduced in accordance with the following
provisions.
A. The employer's obligation to pay weekly compensation
under section 54-B or 55-B shall be reduced by:
(1) Fifty percent of the amount of old age insurance
benefits received or being received under the United States
Social Security Act. . . .
Berry correctly points out that one purpose of section 62-B is to prevent the stacking of benefits,
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