 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Deneau v. the6/2/1994
In this consolidated wrongful death action, plaintiffs, Peggy Deneau, individually and on behalf of the heirs of Evan Deneau, deceased, and Robert and VerJean Francoeur, individually and on behalf of the heirs of Sharon M. Francoeur, deceased, appeal from the judgment dismissing their complaints against defendants, The State of Colorado, its Department of Transportation, its Department of Natural Resources, and its Division of Wildlife. We affirm.
Decedents Evan Deneau and Sharee Francoeur were fatally injured in an automobile accident on Colorado Highway 470 in November 1990. In their complaints, plaintiffs alleged that Deneau and Francoeur were ejected from the passenger compartment after the driver swerved to avoid striking a deer and lost control of the vehicle. In addition, plaintiffs alleged that defendants were negligent in failing to place fences along the right-of-way to prevent deer from entering the traveled portions of the roadway and that the deer crossing on the traveled portion of the highway created an unreasonable hazard to the traveling public.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaints pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) asserting that the actions were barred by the wildlife statute, § 33-3-103(1)(c), C.R.S. (1984 Repl. Vol. 14), which provides that the state shall not be liable for injury to or the death of any person caused by wildlife.
Plaintiffs filed responses in opposition to the motions claiming that defendants' negligence created a dangerous condition on a public highway that interfered with the movement of traffic. Therefore, they asserted that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to support a claim expressly authorized by § 24-10-106(1)(d), C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 10A) of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (GIA).
They argued that wildlife was not the cause of their damages; instead, the cause was defendants' negligence in constructing and maintaining the roadway. Thus, the plaintiffs reasoned that the wildlife statute should not be construed to expand the limited immunity granted by the GIA. Rejecting these arguments, the trial court dismissed the complaint, and this appeal followed.
The issue to be determined is whether provisions of the GIA either directly or by implication repeal the wildlife statute. To decide this question, we apply certain general principles of statutory construction. First, in interpreting a statute, legislative intent is the lodestar. Beth Israel Hospital & Geriatric Center v. District Court, 683 P.2d 343 (Colo. 1984). To determine legislative intent, we look to the plain language of the statute. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1992). And, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to employ further interpretive rules of statutory construction. Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218 (Colo. 1992).
Section 33-3-103(1)(c) of the wildlife statute is short, simple, and, in our view, determinative. It provides that the state shall not be liable for: "Injury to or the death of any person caused by wildlife. . . ." The language of the statute is unambiguous; thus, it needs no further interpretation. Jones v. Cox, supra.
The question becomes whether the GIA creates an exception to the wildlife statute. Under that provision, a public entity is immunized from liability for claims which "lie in tort or could lie in tort" with certain exceptions which waive the immunity. The specific exception argued as applicable here relates to a dangerous con
Page 1 2 3 Colorado Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|