Hartford Insurance Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda Inc.6/9/1994
at victim was owed a duty. Id. at 335 n.4, 503 A.2d at 1341 n.4, discussing Justice Tobriner's dissenting opinion in Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980). We then pointed out, in that case, "that such persons could not be identified in advance does not mean that they are not included in the class." Id. at 336, 503 A.2d at 1341. That observation is equally applicable here, except that, here, the nature of the risk Griffin presented is not itself very clear. Accordingly, we need not further address whether summary judgment was correctly granted on the State's alternate ground.
V.
To be liable for the injuries to the petitioner's insured, it must be proved that Manor Inn's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. This means that the petitioner must establish that the negligence of Manor Inn's employee in leaving the van unattended with the keys in the ignition was a proximate cause of the accident. If, as Manor Inn argues, the actions of Griffin constituted an intervening, superseding act, then Griffin's conduct would be the proximate cause of the accident, thus relieving Manor Inn of any responsibility. We start first with the determination whether Manor Inn was negligent.
Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.) § 21-1101 of the Transportation Article, provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Duty of driver upon leaving unattended vehicle. - Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person driving or otherwise in charge of a motor vehicle may not leave it unattended until the engine is stopped, the ignition locked, the key removed, and the brake effectively set.[ ]
There is no dispute as to what Manor Inn's employee did: he left the keys in the ignition, the doors to the van unlocked, and moved far enough away from the van as to be unable to prevent its theft. We have previously held that leaving the key in the ignition of an unattended vehicle is a violation of the statute. See Khoyan v. Turner, 255 Md. 144, 147, 257 A.2d 219, 220 (1969). We have also said that a vehicle is effectively unattended when its operator is far enough away from it so as not to be able to prevent the occurrence at which the statute is directed. See Hochschild Kohn & Company v. Canoles, 193 Md. 276, 193, 66 A.2d 780, 783 (1949); see also Lustbader v. Traders Delivery Company, 193 Md. 439, 67 A.2d 237, 239-240 (1949); Collins v. Luper, 12 Md. App. 109, 113, 277 A.2d 445, cert. denied, 263 Md. 716 (1971).
"The violation of a statute may furnish evidence of negligence." Atlantic Mutual v. Kenney, 323 Md. 116, 124, 591 A.2d 507, 510 (1991); Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 259-60, 206 A.2d 148, 158 (1965). It may be actionable when it causes harm to a person within the class of persons the statute seeks to protect and the harm is the kind that the statute is designed to prevent. See id. ; Owens v. Simon, 245 Md. 404, 409, 226 A.2d 548, 551 (1967); Prosser and Keaton, supra, § 36 at 224-27. Although the violation of a statute is evidence of negligence, it "is not per se enough to make a violator thereof liable for damages." Liberto v. Holfeldt, 221 Md. 62, 65, 155 A.2d 698, 700 (1959). For that to occur, the plaintiff must show that the violation was a proximate cause of his or her injury, Erie Insurance Co
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|