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Hartford Insurance Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda Inc.6/9/1994
mpany v. Chops, 322 Md. 79, 84, 585 A.2d 232, 234 (1991), that "had not been interrupted by a
break in the chain of causation." Holfeldt, 221 Md. at 65, 155 A.2d at 700.
We have, on several occasions, commented on the purpose of the unattended motor vehicle statute. We may discern, from those occasions, that the purpose of the statute varies depending upon the nature of the violation. In Canoles, 193 Md. at 283, 66 A.2d at 783, in which an oil truck left standing, unattended, with its motor running, ran down a hill striking and permanently injuring the plaintiff, we stated its purpose as being "either to prevent some unauthorized person from starting a car or to prevent the start of the car by gravity. In either case the object was the protection of the public." In Holfeldt, the plaintiff was injured when struck by the defendant's car, which was driven by a thief, whose access to it was facilitated because the defendant left the keys in the ignition. We observed: "The duty to the public created by the statute was primarily to protect against a theft of or tampering with a motor vehicle and to prevent them from moving under their own momentum should the brakes fail." 221 Md. at 66, 155 A.2d at 701. See also Owens v. Simon, 245 Md. at 409, 226 A.2d at 551. For our purpose, Holfeldt is dispositive.
Proximate cause ultimately involves a conclusion that someone will be held legally responsible for the consequences of an act or omission. This determination is subject to considerations of fairness or social policy as well as mere causation. Thus, although an injury might not have occurred 'but for' an antecedent act of the defendant, liability may not be imposed if for example the negligence of one person is merely passive and potential, while the negligence of another is the moving and effective cause of the injury.... Or if the injury is so remote in time and space from defendant's original negligence and another's negligence intervenes.
Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 16, 264 A.2d 851, 855 (1970) (citations omitted). Stated differently, to be a proximate cause of an injury , "the negligence must be 1) a cause in fact, and 2) a legally cognizable cause." Atlantic Mutual v. {PA}
Page 157} Kenn ey, 323 Md. at 127, 591 A.2d at 512. When more than one act of negligence arguably could be responsible for the injury , the question that is presented is whether the second in point of time superseded the first, i.e., did that act intervene and supersede the original act of negligence, thus terminating its role in the causation chain? That is the question presented by this case. Admittedly, the employee of Manor Inn, hence, Manor Inn, was negligent in leaving the keys in the van; however, so too was Griffin negligent in the manner in which he drove the van after stealing it. Query, did Griffin's negligent driving of the van break the chain of causation flowing from Manor Inn's negligence?
We recently addressed the issue of intervening, superseding cause in Kenny. In that case, the defendant parked a tractor trailer in a no parking area near an intersection in such a way as to significantly obstruct the vision of drivers at that intersection. We rejected the defendant's argument that the proximate cause of the accident, a collision between a car exiting the shopping center and another proceeding on the roadway running along side the shopping center, was the negligence
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