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Hartford Insurance Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda Inc.6/9/1994
of the exiting driver. In so doing, we reviewed principles applicable to intervening, superseding cause. Noting the importance of foreseeability in determining the existence of proximate cause, we cited sections 435 and 447 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. We illustrated the
principles enunciated in those sections by discussing certain of our cases.
In Penn Steel Company v. Wilkinson, 107 Md. 574, 69 A. 412 (1908), a defendant who allowed a rope to hang in a loop very low across a public street was negligent and that negligence was held to be the proximate, though not the immediate cause, of the plaintiff's injury , which was caused when the plaintiff's horse was frightened when a stranger moved the rope. We explained:
"The defendant is liable where the intervening causes, acts, or conditions were set in motion by his earlier negligence, or naturally induced by such wrongful act, or omission, or even it is generally held, if the intervening acts or conditions were of a nature, the happening of which was reasonably to have been anticipated, though they have been acts of the plaintiff himself."
Id. at 581, 69 A. at 414-415, quoting 21 Am. & Eng. Ency. 490. Similarly, we held, in Lashley v. Dawson, 162 Md. 549, 160 A. 738 (1932), that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries to the plaintiff, a pedestrian, which were caused when he was struck by a car on the roadway. In that case, the defendant's negligence consisted of its driver failing to illuminate the interior of its bus, which constituted a complete obstruction of traffic on the roadway at night, when the bus's road lights did not reveal its presence. Id. at 559, 601, 160 A. at 739-742. This was true despite the fact that the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident may also have been negligently operating that vehicle. We pointed out:
The mere fact that the original act of the appellants in obstructing the highway would not in itself have injured the appellee is not a defense to his action against them, if it appears that it was known or should have been known to appellants' driver that failure to warn approaching traffic of the obstruction might naturally and probably result in an accident which would or might injure others lawfully in the use of the highway.
Id. at 561-62, 160 A. at 743. See also Bloom v. Good Humor Ice Cream Company, 179 Md. 384, 389, 18 A.2d 592, 594 (1941), in which, assuming that the defendant, the driver of the ice cream truck, was negligent when he invited a minor to cross the street to purchase his ice cream, we rejected the plaintiff's argument that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries where the accident did not occur as the plaintiff was crossing to purchase ice cream. It occurred only after he had left the truck and passed behind it on his return trip, and when the striking automobile appeared suddenly. The Court explained:
[The proximate cause] must be the natural and probable consequence of the negligent act, unbroken by any intervening agency, and where the negligence of any one person is merely passive, and potential, while the negligence of another is the moving and effective cause of the injury , the latter is the proximate cause and fixes the liability.
Bloom, 179 Md. at 387, 18 A.2d at 593-594. See also Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. at 173, 359 A.2d at 556 (1976), quoting Little v. Woodall, 244 Md. 620, 626, 224 A.2d 852, 855 (1966) ("if the situation wrongfully created
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