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Hartford Insurance Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda Inc.6/9/1994
by the defendant increased the risk of damage through the operation of another reasonably foreseeable force, the defendant is liable for the ensuing loss."); Owens v. Simon, 245 Md. at 409, 226 A.2d at 552 (negligence of driver in causing an intersection accident is not the proximate cause of the death of a police officer who was killed when that driver attempted to move his car in response to the officer's instructions and the car malfunctioned).
In Kenny, we stated the test to be:
If the negligent acts of two or more persons, all being culpable and responsible in law for their acts, do not concur in point of time, and the negligence of one only exposes the injured person to risk of injury in case the other should also be negligent, the liability of the person first in fault will depend upon the question whether the negligent act of the other was one which a man of ordinary experience and sagacity, acquainted with all the circumstances, could reasonably anticipate or not. If such a person could have anticipated that the intervening act of negligence might, in a natural and ordinary sequence, follow the original act of negligence, the person first in fault is not released from liability by reason of the intervening negligence of another.
323 Md. at 131, 591 A.2d at 514, quoting State v. Hecht Company, 165 Md. 415, 422, 169 A. 311, 313 (1933).
Leaving the keys in the ignition of a motor vehicle increases significantly the chances of that vehicle being stolen. Thus, viewing the total facts of the case sub judice, it is patent that it was reasonably foreseeable that, by leaving the keys in the ignition, a thief would take the van. In the case sub judice, but for the negligence of Manor Inn, Griffin would not have taken the van. It is not so clear, however, that the thief would drive negligently, and even more unclear that, in doing so, he or she would injure the plaintiff. Consequently, while the negligence of Manor Inn clearly was the proximate cause of the theft of the van, it does not follow that that causal relationship continued from the moment of the theft to the moment of the impact between the van and Wewer's car. Griffin's conduct in taking the van was not "highly extraordinary"; indeed, it was highly predictable. On the other hand, the manner in which he drove the van, and its consequences, were "highly extraordinary." The Court of Special Appeals correctly affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.
This is consistent with our holding in Holfeldt. In that case, we held, alternatively, that leaving the keys in the ignition of an automobile "was not the proximate cause of the injury both on the basis that it was not foreseeable that the thief would be involved in an accident five days later and that the negligence
of the thief was an independent intervening cause which was in fact the proximate cause of the accident." 221 Md. at 67, 155 A.2d at 701. The latter basis for the decision is consistent with decisions reached by courts in other jurisdictions.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE PETITIONER.
Disposition
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE PETITIONER.
Judges Footnotes
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