 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Hartford Insurance Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda Inc.6/9/1994
in which an appellate court of this State has been presented with, and decided, the issue in this case. In Furr, the third party was Arthur Goode, a sexual deviate who had been voluntarily admitted to Spring Grove State Hospital upon recommendation of one of the defendant psychiatrists. The admission followed Goode's having been sentenced to a suspended sentence for a charge relating to the commission of unnatural sex acts on little boys. Goode absconded from Spring Grove and, eleven days later, murdered a young boy.
The intermediate appellate court rejected the argument that the duty of the psychiatrists in that case ran to the public at
large. Instead, "noting the narrowing of the object of one's duty from all the world at old common law, to a 'foreseeable plaintiff,'" citing Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, and relying on section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, adopted in Scott v. Watson, supra, which it interpreted as holding "that as a general rule a private person is under no special duty to protect another from criminal acts by a third person, in the absence of a statute, or special relationship," 53 Md. App. at 482, 454 A.2d at 418, the Furr court held that the psychiatrist's duty does not extend to the victim unless the victim is readily identifiable. Id. at 489, 454 A.2d at 421. In reaching this holding, the Court of Special Appeals commented on Tarasoff and Thompson, which explicated Tarasoff. In Tarasoff, the victim was the known, and, therefore, specifically identifiable and a foreseeable object of the patient's threat, thus the duty found in Tarasoff applied "only when the doctor knows the identity of the victim who has been threatened." Furr, 53 Md. App. at 487, 454 A.2d at 420. Explicating Tarasoff, Thompson made clear that "although the intended victim as a precondition to liability need not be specifically named, he must be 'readily identifiable.'" 614 P.2d at 734. The court concluded that the principle enunciated in Tarasoff "coalesces with ยง 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts." Furr, 53 Md. App. at 488, 454 A.2d at 421. See also McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500, 511-12 (1979).
Furthermore, recognizing an inconsistency between the negligence the plaintiffs alleged and the duty they would impose, the court observed:
The negligence they charge of misdiagnosis [and recommendation] and failure to readmit Goode does not relate to any known dangerous propensity of Goode. Assuming that appellees should have known of his dangerous propensities and restrained Goode, whom should they have warned that they had failed to do so?
Furr, 53 Md. App. at 488, 454 A.2d at 421.
We commented on a similar argument in Henley and seemed to reject it. 305 Md. at 334-36, 503 A.2d at 1340-1341.
We recognized that applying foreseeability analysis to the determination of "the existence of a duty has in some cases spawned the belief that a duty will be found only in favor of 'identifiable plaintiffs,' i.e., those within a foreseeable zone of danger whose identities are known in advance." Id. at 334, 503 A.2d at 1340. We have cautioned, however, that, while relevant to the duty to warn, it "is not necessarily relevant to the existence of other duties that might arise." Id. at 336, 503 A.2d at 1341. Moreover, we acknowledged that the question whether a victim feasibly can be identified is different from the question whether th
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
By using the system, you agree to TERMS OF SERVICE
|