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Appeal of Briand6/10/1994
f the claimant's work at MacMulkin Chevrolet to her medical condition." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the board stated that Dr. Rahman's opinion did not satisfy Briand's burden of proof, and at the same time, the board rephrased what that burden should be.
[ 1 ] On appeal, Briand first argues that the board erred as a matter of law in failing to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard. In workers' compensation cases, a claimant "has the burden of proving by competent evidence both the existence of a compensable accidental injury and the extent of his disability." City of Rochester v. Smith , 119 N.H. 495, 496, 403 A.2d 421, 422 (1979). The claimant must prove both medical and legal causation by a preponderance of the evidence. See New Hampshire Supply Co. v. Steinberg , 119 N.H. 223, 230, 400 A.2d 1163, 1168 (1979). Thus, the board's use in its original decision of the "reasonable medical certainty" standard was erroneous because it is a higher standard than that required by law.
[ 2 ] Briand argues that the board erred by amending its Discussion of the burden of proof in its denial of her motion for rehearing, by not conducting a new hearing and by not applying the amended standard. RSA 541:3 provides a mechanism whereby administrative agencies may reconsider their decisions on the pleadings and evidence already before them without a hearing. The board acknowledged in its decision on the claimant's motion for rehearing that the wrong standard had previously been applied, and then determined that when the amended standard was applied to the record, Briand still failed to meet her burden of proof. Having duly considered Briand's case according to the proper standard of competent medical testimony, the board did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law with respect to the standard of proof applied.
The next issue on appeal concerns the board's treatment of an auto accident experienced by Briand when she was a child. In its initial decision, the board stated: "If we accept the fact that the claimant had some neck problems as a result of an auto accident as a young child, then we would have to find that there is a separate and intervening incident arising out of and in the course of employment which caused this condition to become disabling." Briand argues that the board erred by extrapolating a pre-existing condition from the following: a letter dated August 27, 1991, from Dr. Rahman to Dr. Douglas Joseph (Briand's original physician), mentioning Briand's account of a childhood car accident and that she began feeling soreness in her neck since then; and a notation concerning physical therapy in a St. Joseph's Hospital record on September 19, 1991, that says: "Cervical spine --long history of problems." Briand contends that the board's decision, based on these documents, which are referred to as "two separate histories," implies that her condition stems from that accident. She argues that the board erred by failing to give reasons for not accepting her uncontradicted account that this accident of thirty years ago has no bearing on her present condition. See Appeal of Lambrou , 136 N.H. 18, 20, 609 A.2d 754, 755 (1992); 3 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation ยง 80.23 (1993).
[ 3 ] We have held that the board's findings of fact, and decision made pursuant to those findings, will not be disturbed if supported by competent evidence in the record. Appeal of Lambrou , 136 N.H. at 20, 609 A.2d at 755. RSA 541:13 states that "all findings of the commission upon all questions of fact properly before it shall be deemed to be prima facie lawful and reasonable." RSA 541:13 (1974). This presumption may be overcome only by a showing that there was no evidence from which th
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