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Appeal of Briand6/10/1994
e board could conclude as it did. Appeal of Granite State Elec. Co. , 121 N.H. 787, 791, 435 A.2d 119, 121 (1981). Our review of the record indicates that there was evidence upon which the board could properly make its findings. Briand next argues that the board erred in denying benefits for the aggravation of her pre-existing neck condition on the basis that no "incident" occurred on her job. We agree. In accepting as fact that the childhood auto accident was the cause of Briand's neck problems, the board stated that it would have to find a "separate and intervening incident" that caused the condition to be disabling before awarding the claimant compensation. The relevant statute dealing with whether an injury is compensable defines injury or personal injury as "accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment, or any occupational disease or resulting death arising out of and in the course of employment. " RSA 281-A:2, XI (Supp. 1993). In order to receive compensation, an injured employee must prove that the injury or death was both accidental and causally related to his employment. Steinberg , 119 N.H. at 226, 400 A.2d at 1165.
[ 4, 5 ] First we consider the accidental requirement. "An accidental injury within the meaning of worker 's compensation law need not be traumatic or dramatic. The aggravation of a pre-existing physical condition is compensable if occasioned by accidental injury." Walter v. Hagianis , 97 N.H. 314, 317, 87 A.2d 154, 157 (1952); see RSA 281-A:2, XI (defining "injury"); cf Town of Hudson v. Wynott , 128 N.H. 478, 482, 522 A.2d 974, 976 (1986) (employer responsible for first work-related injury not accountable for progression of injury if second, independent incident occurs). A disability may arise from routine activities, as in this case where Briand complained of activities on the job that led to her condition, and still be compensable if it results in an unexpected effect. See Steinberg , 119 N.H. at 226, 400 A.2d at 1165-66. A disability may develop gradually, but an acute manifestation occurring on a particular day which is so intolerable that it prevents the claimant from working is considered an accidental injury for purposes of compensation . Kacavisti v. Sprague Electric Co. , 102 N.H. 266, 269-70, 155 A.2d 183, 185 (1959). This description is consistent with Dr. Emond's testimony that a sudden onset of Briand's pre-existing condition occurred in August and December of 1991 because of her physical exertion on the job. Thus, Briand has met the accidental requirement of RSA 281-A:2, XI , and we reverse the board's finding to the contrary.
Briand must also prove that the employment caused or contributed to her disability. See Cheshire Toyota/Volvo, Inc. v. O'Sullivan , 129 N.H. 698, 701, 531 A.2d 714, 715 (1987). In this respect, the claimant must show both legal causation, i.e. , that her injury is work-connected, and medical causation, i.e. , that her disability was actually caused by the work-related event. Tzimas v. Coiffures By Michael , 135 N.H. 498, 500, 606 A.2d 1082, 1083 (1992). In its decision, however, the board made no determination as to legal causation, but found that Briand did not satisfy the burden of proof for medical causation. On remand, the board may choose to reach a decision as to legal causation as well, but our analysis concerns solely the board's determination of medical causation.
The board relied on Dr. Emond's testimony for the proposition that Briand's degenerative disc disease "was only irritated by the type of work she performed at MacMulkin" (emphasis added), in its determination that "the work at MacMulkin Chevrolet did nothing to contribute to the progression of the claimant's degenerative disc disea
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