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Appeal of Briand6/10/1994
se." Thus, the board found that no medical causation was proven.
[ 6 ] The board's determination that there was no contribution to Briand's underlying disorder is supported by the record. We have not previously determined whether the mere activation of disabling symptoms absent an accompanying worsening of the underlying condition may be compensable. While we recognize that some other jurisdictions have determined that mere symptomology is not compensable, the better rule allows for compensation where work-related activities are the medical and legal cause of the "lighting up" or activation of disabling symptoms, regardless of the cause of the underlying disorder. See Bryant v. Masters Mach. Co. , 444 A.2d 329, 334 (Me. 1982); see also Mandex, Inc. v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona , 151 Ariz. 567, 570, 729 P.2d 921, 924 (1986). In Bryant , where the claimant's fall from his stool at work combined with a pre-existing arthritic condition of the cervical spine to produce pain sufficient for the requirements of medical causation, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the onset of symptoms resulting from work activity is compensable, Bryant , 444 A.2d at 334, regardless of the specific nature of the symptoms, id . at 342. In the case at hand, there is the testimony of Briand that she experienced severe neck and back pain, as well as the diagnosis of Dr. Rahman that Briand suffered from chronic pain syndrome. On remand, the board must interpret Dr. Emond's testimony with the purpose of determining, pursuant to our traditional tests of medical and legal causation in cases involving pre-existing conditions, see O'Sullivan , 129 N.H. at 701, 531 A.2d at 715, whether Briand's work-related exertion activated disabling symptoms of a pre-existing condition. We vacate the board's finding on causation and remand for application of the correct legal standard. We hold that since the board improperly interpreted the accidental requirement for a compensable injury and may not have accurately evaluated Dr. Emond's testimony for use in the application of the standard for medical causation, its decision must be reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. Upon remand, the board should make specific findings of fact supporting its decision to grant or deny benefits. See Appeal of Lambrou , 136 N.H. at 21, 609 A.2d at 756.
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