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Williams v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co.5/31/1994
PEGGY BRYANT, Judge.
Plaintiffs-appellants, Michael J. Williams, Jr., Michael J. Williams, Sr., and Theresa L. Williams ("plaintiffs"), appeal from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the summary judgment motion of defendant-appellee, Grange Mutual Casualty Company ("Grange"), on behalf of itself and its insureds, defendants-appellees, Larry K. and Patricia I. Baeumel.
On May 1, 1992, plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action against defendants, asserting that Patricia Baeumel negligently drove her motor vehicle, colliding with a motor vehicle driven by plaintiff, Michael J. Williams, Jr., and causing severe injury to him. While plaintiffs apparently filed a separate action against the Baeumels, in the present action they sought (1) a determination of which among the policies Grange issued to the Baeumels provides coverage for the collision at issue, (2) a determination of the limits of Grange's liability under the policy or policies applicable to these facts, and (3) damages for Grange's bad-faith handling of plaintiffs' claim and its failure to make payment on that claim.
Grange ultimately filed motions for summary judgment asserting that under the anti-stacking language of the policies at issue, only one policy Grange issued to the Baeumels provides coverage concerning the collision at issue; that, under the language of the policy, the maximum limit of liability to plaintiffs is $100,000; and that Grange did not exercise bad faith in handling plaintiffs' claim. Following full briefing, the trial court granted Grange's motion for summary judgment. While plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision, the trial court found plaintiffs' arguments unpersuasive and refused to modify its original decision, instead granting judgment to defendants in accordance with its earlier decision.
Plaintiffs appeal, assigning the following errors:
"I. The trial court erred as a matter of law in overruling plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, thereby concluding that the parents of a minor do not have a derivative action for the medical expenses incurred by their minor child that is subject to separate `per person' liability policy limits.
"II. The trial court as a matter of law erred when it overruled plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, thereby concluding that the parents of a minor do not have a derivative action for their individual loss of consortium claim subject to separate `per person' liability policy limits.
"III. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it overruled plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment due to the fact that the trial court's decision was erroneously decided, its rationale being misplaced under Ohio law, and against the manifest weight of the evidence."
Plaintiffs' three assignments of error are interrelated. They do not challenge the trial court's determination with respect to the anti-stacking provisions of the various policies Grange issued to the Baeumels, nor do they challenge the trial court's determination that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Grange acted in bad faith as defined in Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. (1962), 174 Ohio St. 148, 21 O.O.2d 420, 187 N.E.2d 45. Rather, plaintiffs' three assignments of error raise the sole issue of whether the trial court properly determined the limits of liability under the single policy of insurance applicable to the collision subject of plaintiffs' action against Patricia Baeumel.
The pertinent facts were stipulated between the parties. Specifically, on or about January 29, 199
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