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Aspen Drilling Co. v. Hayes2/24/1994
Defendant, Jo Hayes, a/k/a Josephine Hayes, appeals the judgment of the trial court in favor of plaintiff, Aspen Drilling Co., Inc. (Aspen Drilling), permitting foreclosure of a mechanic's lien on Hayes' property, denying Hayes' motion for a trial by jury, and awarding Aspen Drilling $7,618.49 plus costs and interest for breach of contract. We affirm.
I. Application of Lien on Wells and Equipment Statute
Hayes contends that the trial court improperly concluded that Aspen Drilling had recorded and perfected a lien on her property under the lien on wells and equipment statute, § 38-24-101, et seq., C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 16A) (Article 24) instead of the general mechanics' lien statute, § 38-23-101, et seq., C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 16A) (Article 23). She further contends that because of this improper application of the statute she was denied her right to a jury trial. We disagree.
Hayes orally contracted with Aspen Drilling to evaluate an old well on her property. The well was found to be contaminated with an oily substance and unusable. Hayes then contracted with Aspen Drilling to drill a test well in another location on her property. Aspen Drilling completed the test well. Hayes was not satisfied with the quantity and quality of the water the test well produced, refused to pay Aspen Drilling the balance owed for the drilling of the test well, and ordered Aspen Drilling not to return to her property.
On October 15, 1991, Aspen Drilling notified Hayes of its intent to file a lien statement and submitted an invoice for the amount owed on the test well. After receiving the return receipt signed by Hayes, Aspen Drilling recorded the lien against Hayes' property. Later, Aspen discovered that it had provided an incorrect legal description of Hayes' property. Accordingly, it filed a second notice of intent to file a lien and recorded an amended statement of lien on March 13, 1992 after receiving the return receipt signed by Hayes. Aspen Drilling commenced foreclosure and recorded a lis pendens on April 30, 1992.
Before trial, the trial court denied Hayes' request for a jury trial because it found that the lien issue before it was equitable and could not be tried before a jury.
At trial, Hayes argued that Aspen Drilling was precluded from foreclosing on the lien because the lien was time-barred under Article 23, which allows four months to file a lien after completion of the work. Section 38-23-109, C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 16A). Aspen Drilling contends that it filed the lien pursuant to Article 24, which allows six months to file a lien after completion of the work. Section 38-24-101, et seq., C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 16A). The trial court found that Aspen Drilling had filed its lien under Article 24 and that its lien was, therefore, not time-barred.
The determination of which statute is applicable to a lien filed on a water well is an issue of first impression in Colorado. Cf. Beeman Brothers Drilling v. First Interstate Bank, 784 P.2d 836 (Colo. App. 1989) (Article 23 applied to resolve water well lien issue but no issue raised as to which statute applied and result would have been the same under either statute).
Our determination of which statute applies here is governed by principles of statutory interpretation. In interpreting statutory language, we must effectuate the plain meaning of the words used by the General Assembly by giving words and phrases found in statutory provisions their familiar and generally accepted meaning. Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez School District RE-1, 841 P.2d 237 (C
Page 1 2 3 4 Colorado Personal Injury Attorneys
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