 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Ranger v. Fortune Insurance Co.2/24/1994
In this action to recover punitive and treble damages for an insurer's alleged bad-faith refusal to pay personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, plaintiff, Cliff Ranger, appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of defendant, Fortune Insurance Co., a Florida corporation. We reverse and remand.
The complaint alleged that, in 1984, plaintiff, a Colorado resident, was injured in an automobile accident in Colorado. It further alleged that, at the time of the accident, plaintiff was riding as a passenger in a vehicle insured by Fortune. According to the complaint, although Fortune had admitted coverage of the driver of the vehicle and the accident's occurrence within Colorado, it had refused to pay plaintiff's medical bills.
Fortune filed a motion to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, which was granted by the trial court. In a previous appeal, a division of this court concluded that plaintiff had established a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction and reversed the judgment of dismissal, remanding the case with an order to reinstate the complaint. See Ranger v. Fortune Insurance Co., 817 P.2d 600 (Colo. App. 1991).
Following the remand, Fortune filed an answer asserting several affirmative defenses. It also filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that, under Florida law, it had no obligation to pay plaintiff any PIP benefits. Fortune further asserted that it would be unconstitutional to construe § 10-4-711(4)(a), C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 4A) of the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act (the No-Fault Act) to require a Florida insurer to pay such benefits to plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, with supporting documents, asserting that, although Fortune had subsequently paid the medical bills "many years late," plaintiff was entitled to treble damages and 18% interest on the unpaid medical bills. After oral argument, the trial court granted Fortune's motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff's cross-motion on the basis that Florida law governed the coverage available to plaintiff under the policy.
I.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Florida law was applicable to the facts of this case. In support of this contention, plaintiff argues that the trial court should have applied Colorado law, specifically § 10-4-711(4)(a). We agree.
In the area of multistate tort controversies, Colorado has adopted the general rule of applying the law of the state having the most "significant relationship" with the occurrence and the parties as contained in the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971). First National Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314 (1973); Abdelsamed v. New York Life Insurance Co., 857 P.2d 421 (Colo. App. 1992).
We are further guided by the principles in comment (c) to that Restatement section, namely, that when a tort rule is designed primarily to compensate the victim for his injuries, the state where the injury occurred, which is often where the plaintiff resides, may have the greater interest in the controversy.
Here, the insured driver of the vehicle was visiting this state, and plaintiff, a Colorado resident, was riding in the vehicle as a passenger at the time of the accident. Accordingly, we conclude that, in this case, Colorado - not Florida - had the most significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties and that, therefore, its law should apply.
Addressing the application of Colorado law, we note that one of the primary purposes o
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Colorado Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|