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GILES v. NEW HAVEN2/8/1994
eglect[;] (3) he injurious occurrence or condition must have happened irrespective of any voluntary action at the time by the party injured.' Schurgast v. Schumann, [156 Conn. 471, 479, 242 A.2d 695 (1968)]; Briganti v. Connecticut Co., 119 Conn. 316, 320, 175 A. 679 (1934); Stebel v. Connecticut
Co., [90 Conn. 24, 26, 96 A. 171 (1915)]; 4 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, [Torts (2d Ed. 1986) 19.5 through 19.12]. Whether the doctrine applies in a given case is a question of law for the court." Malvicini v. Stratfield Motor Hotel, Inc., supra, 443.
Before the Appellate Court the parties agreed that the first condition had been met: the accident would not have occurred unless someone had been negligent. Giles v. New Haven, supra, 154. The parties were, however, in disagreement about whether the plaintiff had made a case for the jury with respect to the second and third conditions of the doctrine, namely, control of the elevator by the defendant and the absence of responsibility for the accident on the part of the plaintiff. Malvicini v. Stratfield Motor Hotel, Inc., supra.
The defendant challenges the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to this case because in its view the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendant had exclusive control over the elevator. Specifically, the defendant argues that because the plaintiff operated the elevator and controlled its movement and its chain's sway, she could not benefit from the doctrine notwithstanding the defendant's own duty to maintain and inspect the elevator and to warn of any dangerous propensity. We disagree and take this opportunity to clarify some of the confusion in our earlier cases regarding the present scope of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
At the outset, we note that the plaintiff's evidence of the defendant's responsibility need not be irrefutable; rather, the plaintiff need only establish enough evidence that, if credited, presents the defendant's negligence as the most plausible explanation. Sedlitsky v. Pareso, 400 Pa. Super. 1, 5, 582 A.2d 1314 (1990); 2 Restatement (Second), Torts 328 D, comment (e). In other words, "` he plaintiff need not . . . conclusively
exclude all other possible explanations, and so prove his [or her] case beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . It is enough that the facts proved reasonably permit the conclusion that [the defendant's] negligence is the more probable explanation.'" 2 Restatement (Second), Torts, 328D, comment (e). Whether res ipsa applies depends upon whether the defendant's negligence was the most plausible explanation for the plaintiff's injury ; the doctrine does not apply if there are other reasonable explanations for the plaintiff's accidental injury. Sedlitsky v. Pareso, supra.
To avail herself of the inference afforded by the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was responsible for the specific instrumentality that caused the event. Malvicini v. Stratfield Motor Hotel, Inc., supra, 443. Proof of the defendant's control over the instrumentality, demonstrates its responsibility in satisfaction of the second condition of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Although the term "exclusive" control does not explicitly appear in the original articulation of that condition, the term has found its way into this court's previous discussions of the issue. Id., 445, and cases cited therein dating back to 1915. Nevertheless, in describing the extent of the defendant's control of the use of the instrumentality, we have never held that any use whatsoever of the instrumentality by the plaintiff would automatically preclude application of res ipsa loquitur. Bluett v. Eli Skating Club, 133 Conn. 9
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