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Wiggins v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.9/21/1993
ion plus prejudgment interest on the judgment amount less the $25,000 paid by Reliance. In addition, the trial court allocated the $82,167.15 that Nationwide previously paid between the principal and interest.
Nationwide contends that under the policy language it has no contractual obligation to pay the prejudgment interest in this case. Both the Crowe and the Wiggins policies contain the following provisions in the UIM coverage sections:
We will pay damages which a covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an [underinsured] motor vehicle because of:
1. Bodily injury sustained by a covered person and caused by an accident; and
2. Property damage caused by an accident.
(Emphasis omitted).
Nationwide argues that "damages" does not include costs or interest. The North Carolina Supreme Court recently addressed this exact issue in Baxley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 334 N.C. 1, 430 S.E.2d 895 (1993). After a thorough examination of what is contemplated by the term "damages" the Court held that under the terms of the policy, Nationwide was obligated to pay prejudgment interest on the jury verdict up to its policy limits. As in Baxley, Nationwide in this case "promised to pay plaintiff's resulting damages, [thus] it must now do so up to, but not in excess of, its UIM policy limits." Baxley, 334 N.C. at 11, 430 S.E.2d at 901.
Based on the foregoing Discussion, the decision of the trial court is:
REVERSED as to the trial court's order allowing intrapolicy stacking for the two Crowe vehicles, and
AFFIRMED in all other aspects.
Disposition
REVERSED as to the trial court's order allowing intrapolicy stacking for the two Crowe vehicles, and AFFIRMED in all other aspects.
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