PEAY v. U.S. SILICA COMPANY
9/20/1993
Pursuant to Rule 228, SCACR, the following question has been certified to this Court by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina:
When a statutory employee has drawn benefits
under the workers' Compensation System, can an
"owner" as defined by S.C. Code Ann. section
42-1-400, who has intentionally exposed that
statutory employee to a hazardous substance
that was substantially certain to cause the
employee harm, claim the protection of the
exclusive remedy provision of the Workers'
Compensation System, or would the holding of
Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330,
407 S.E.2d 222 (1991), be applied, allowing the employee
to also bring suit at common law for
intentional tort against the owner?
I. FACTS
Plaintiff Van Peay (Peay) was an electrician employed by A&P Electrical Service, Inc. from 1965 to 1981 and by Hobgood Electric Machinery Company (Hobgood) from 1981 to 1983. U.S. Silica Company (U.S. Silica) contracted with these businesses to have Peay install, service, and maintain electrical lines and equipment at the U.S. Silica sand mining plant in Columbia. Peay worked primarily in the mill building at U.S. Silica's plant, an area of high risk for exposure to fine particles of sand and silica dust. U.S. Silica knew that unprotected and excessive exposure to respirable silica dust was hazardous and could, under certain circumstances, cause
Peay contracted silicosis and received workers' compensation benefits for that condition from Hobgood's insurance carrier.
Subsequently, Peay filed this action, alleging U.S. Silica was substantially certain that exposure to silica dust would injure him. U.S. Silica removed the case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship and then filed for summary judgment, claiming that workers' compensation was Peay's exclusive remedy. As a result of that motion, the aforementioned question was certified to this Court.
II. DISCUSSION
The exclusivity provision of The South Carolina Workers' Compensation Law, S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-540 (1985), provides:
The rights and remedies granted by this Title
to an employee when he and his employer have
accepted the provisions of this Title,
respectively, to pay and accept compensation
on account of
It is well settled that a common law cause of action is not barred by section 42-1-540 if the employer acted with a deliberate or specific intent to injure the employee. McSwain v. Shei, 304 S.C. 25, 402 S.E.2d 890 (1991) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940) (malicious assault and battery). See also 2A Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law § 68.10 (1993) (hereinafter "Larson's"). Peay argues that injuries which are "substantially certain" to result from an employer's act also should fall within the intentional injury exception to section 42-1-540. We disagree.
"Intent" is a state of mind about the consequences of an act. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 8 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988). In its most narrow sense, "intent" denotes an actor's specific desire to cause the consequences of his act. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965). However, "intent" may be construed more broadly to include consequences which are not desired. Where an actor knows that consequences are
When construing a statute, the Court must ascertain and effectuate the actual intent of the Legislature. Horn v. Davis Elec. Constructors, Inc., 307 S.C. 559, 416 S.E.2d 634 (1992). Workers' compensa
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