 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
RIDEN v. KEMET ELECTRONICS CORP.9/20/1993
Earl Lee Riden and his wife, Faye Riden, brought this negligence action against Kemet Electronics Corporation and Insulation Services seeking damages for personal injuries and loss of consortium resulting from an explosion that occurred at Kemet's plant. Kemet moved for summary judgment, claiming Riden was its statutory employee as a matter of law and therefore Riden's exclusive remedy was a claim for worker's compensation benefits under S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-540 (1985). The trial court denied Kemet's summary judgment motion. Kemet appeals. We reverse and remand.
Upon successfully bidding for a clean-up job at Kemet,
I.
Kemet claims the trial court erred in denying its motion because Riden, at the time he was injured, was Kemet's statutory employee in accordance with S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-400 (1985). We agree.
The question of whether a worker is a statutory employee is jurisdictional and is therefore a question of law for the court. Bigham v. Nassau Recycle Corp., 285 S.C. 200, 328 S.E.2d 663 (Ct.App. 1985). Any dispute in the facts giving rise to this issue should be resolved by the court, not a jury. Bargesser v. Coleman Co., 230 S.C. 562, 96 S.E.2d 825 (1957).
In determining whether Riden's activity at Kemet is sufficient to make him a statutory employee within the meaning of S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-400, we must consider three factors: (1) whether the activity is an important part of Kemet's trade or business; (2) whether the activity is a necessary, essential and integral part of Kemet's trade, business or occupation; and (3) whether the activity has been performed by employees of Kemet. Boone v. Huntington and Guerry Electric Co., ___ S.C. ___, 430 S.E.2d 507 (1993). Only one of these factors must be shown in order for Riden to be considered a statutory employee. Woodard, Davis Adv. No. 16, at 12. Any doubts as to a worker's status should be resolved in favor of including him or her under the Workers' Compensation
Kemet's basis for its motion is an affidavit submitted by David Reynolds, a supervisor at Kemet, which states that the work Riden was performing when he was injured was in the course of Kemet's trade, business, profession or occupation. Riden does not dispute the evidence contained in Reynolds' affidavit, rather he claims Reynolds' affidavit is not sufficient for Kemet to meet its burden of proof. After examining Reynolds' affidavit and the record, however, we find the work Riden performed for Kemet was in the course of Kemet's business within the meaning of section 42-1-400. See Woodard, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 16, at 7 (wherein the court reversed the trial court's denial of an employer's motion for summary judgment where it was undisputed that the recovery, storage, and reprocessing of "black liquor" was an ordinary and necessary part of the employer's business); Chew v. Newsome Chevrolet, Inc., Op. No. 2027 (S.C. Ct. App. filed June 7, 1993) (Davis Adv. Sh. No. 16) (wherein the court reversed the trial court's denial of an employer's motion for summary judgment where the facts were undisputed that security services were a necessary part of the employer's general business).
II.
Kemet also asserts that Riden is not a casual employee for purposes of this action and is therefore not exempt from the Workers' Compensation Act under S.C. Code Ann. §§ 42-1-130 (Supp. 1992) and 42-1-360 (1985). We agree.
Although the predecessor statutes to section 42-1-130 contained the identical language of the statute as it reads today, the predecessor to section 42-1-360 simply exempted casual employees from the Workers' Compensation Act without any reference whatever to any other section of the Act. Thus, in construing the stat
Page 1 2 South Carolina Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|