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RIDEN v. KEMET ELECTRONICS CORP.9/20/1993
utes, the courts exempted "casual" employees from workers' compensation benefits without any regard to whether the worker's activity was in the course of the employer's trade, business, profession or occupation. See Jolly v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 207 S.C. 1, 35 S.E.2d 42 (1945) (wherein the court held that a worker, because his employment was "casual," was excluded from receiving workers' compensation benefits even though the work he performed was in the course of his employer's business or occupation); Benbow v. Edmunds High School, 220 S.C. 363, 67 S.E.2d 680 (1951) (wherein the court, in construing the workers' compensation statutes, considered only whether an employee was "casual" to determine if he was entitled to workers' compensation benefits).
In 1974, however, the legislature, presumably to clarify the inconsistent provisions, added to section 72-107, the predecessor to section 42-1-360, the language "as defined in Section 72-11, [the predecessor to section 42-1-130]."
Thus, the test to determine whether Riden is excluded from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act is now two-pronged. We must consider (1) whether Riden's work for Kemet was casual; and (2) whether Riden was performing work for Kemet that was not in the course of Kemet's trade, business, profession or occupation. S.C. Code Ann. ยง 42-1-130 (Supp. 1992). See Smith v. Coastal Tire and Auto Service, 263 S.C. 77, 207 S.E.2d 810 (1974) (wherein the court, in determining whether an injury that took place in 1970 was covered under workers' compensation, only considered whether the worker's employment was casual); Privette v. S.C. State Forestry Comm'n, 265 S.C. 117, 217 S.E.2d 25 (1975) (wherein the court considered only whether a workers' employment was casual for a cause of action that arose in 1971).
Under the analysis that must now be used, Riden will be excluded from receiving workers' compensation benefits only if his work was casual and not in the course of Kemet's
We therefore reverse the trial court's denial of Kemet's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remand with instructions that the trial court enter judgment dismissing this action.
Reversed and remanded.
HOWELL, C.J., and CURETON, J., concur.
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