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Tollycraft Yachts Corp. v. McCoy9/16/1993
vity is itself not necessarily a virtue, nor always favorable to the injured worker. The Department may employ its reconsideration
authority to reverse or modify decisions adverse to both self-insured employers and to workers. There is no legal reason to believe the Department would in operation exhibit a bias one way or the other. Indeed, injured workers might ultimately be the most disadvantaged under McCoy's reading of the statute, since the Department would frequently be under pressure to issue a denial of an application to reopen simply to meet the statutory deadline. The applicant would then be required to appeal to the Board and perhaps to the courts in order to enforce his or her rights.
Third and finally, McCoy's interpretation is inferior because it effectively reads the amendment as a partial implicit repeal of the Department's authority under RCW 51.52.060. McCoy would have this court construe the 1988 amendment not only as constraining the Department's obligations to process applications but also as truncating the Department's longstanding authority to reconsider its decisions. The implicit repeal of statutes is strongly disfavored. Our Lady of Lourdes Hosp. v. Franklin Cy., 120 Wash. 2d 439, 450, 842 P.2d 956 (1993); Bellevue Sch. Dist. 405 v. Brazier Constr. Co., 103 Wash. 2d 111, 123, 691 P.2d 178 (1984). Where, as here, an amendment may be harmonized with the existing provisions and purposes of a statutory scheme, there is no implicit repeal. Brazier Constr. Co., 103 Wash. 2d at 123.
For these reasons, we hold that once the Department issues an order denying an application to reopen, the requirements of RCW 51.32.160 are satisfied and only the deadlines contained within RCW 51.52.060 constrain the Department's authority to reconsider its decision to deny the application. In this case, McCoy's application to reopen was not "deemed granted" on May 8, since the Department had issued an order denying the application.
Given this holding, it is unnecessary for us to consider two additional contentions raised by Tollycraft. Tollycraft
argues that, even if McCoy's application to reopen is "deemed granted", the Department may nonetheless employ its RCW 51.52.060 authority to reconsider such a "deemed granted" decision. It also argues that it has a right, either under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or under the Act, to a hearing on a "deemed granted" decision just as it would with respect to an explicit departmental decision to reopen a claim. These issues are moot because McCoy's application was not correctly "deemed granted". We therefore reserve the questions of whether "deemed granted" decisions may be reconsidered under RCW 51.52.060 and the rights of self-insurers to challenge such decisions for appropriate future cases.
The order of summary judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Disposition
Holding that the Department of Labor and Industries was authorized to reconsider its prior decision denying the employee's application to reopen the claim and that the Department had acted within applicable time limits when it denied the application, the court reverses the judgment.
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