 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Joplin v. Industrial Commission3/2/1993
viation, the purpose of deviation, the amount of increased risk caused by the deviation, the nature of the employee's job, and whether there is an identifiable moment when the employee's work duties ended. 1 Larson, supra, § 19.29(c) at 4-387 -- 88 (1992).
We cannot disturb the A.L.J.'s Conclusion in circumstances "where the time element becomes of importance in deciding whether the employment was terminated by deviation and two reasonable inferences could be drawn . . ." Sherrill, 78 Ariz. at 338, 279 P.2d at 911. Absent hard and fast rules, factual questions are to be decided by the A.L.J. Fisher Contracting Co., 27 Ariz. App. at 401, 555 P.2d at 370. The A.L.J. found that claimant left the medical supply house at 10:15 a.m. and was injured in a motor vehicle accident three hours later. We defer to the A.L.J.'s finding that claimant thereby substantially deviated from covered employee travel and thus removed himself from the coverage of the workers' compensation laws.
III.
The respondent carrier also contends that the going and coming rule applies to travel for medical treatment. Generally, accidents which occur when an employee is going to or coming from work are not considered to arise out of or occur in the course of employment. Brooks v. Industrial Comm'n, 136 Ariz. 146, 664 P.2d 690 (App. 1983).
Other jurisdictions have considered and rejected the extension of the going and coming rule to injuries while traveling for treatment of an industrial injury . See Kodiak Oilfield Haulers, 777 P.2d at 1149; Fenton, 741 P.2d at 519. Because the injured worker must submit to reasonable treatment, travel for this treatment is necessary. See Ariz.Const. art. XVIII, § 8. Such travel is analogous to a "special errand" impliedly authorized by the employer. Kodiak Oilfield Haulers, 777 P.2d at 1149. Therefore, travel for medical treatment is not ineligible for coverage under the going and coming rule.
IV.
The carrier also argues that the auto accident was a superseding cause of claimant's injuries. This court has recently rejected the superseding cause argument. Unless the claimant is negligent or the causal connection to the industrial injury is too attenuated to support compensability, an injury in an auto accident after an industrial injury may be a compensable consequence of the industrial injury. See Lou Grubb Chevrolet, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 174 Ariz. 23, 25-27, 846 P.2d 836, 838-840, (App.1992).
V.
Finally, the carrier contends that the employee's settlement of the automobile tort claim without the carrier's consent insulates it from liability. Because he found that the claimant had substantially deviated from covered travel, the A.L.J. did not address this argument. Consequently, we do not consider this issue on review.
The award denying compensation for the injuries suffered in the nonindustrial auto accident is affirmed.
Judges Footnotes
Page 1 2 3 4 Arizona Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|