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Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Foundation Inc.3/25/1993
cidental personal injury" is used consistently throughout this title to avoid confusion.
See Office & Prof. Employees Int'l v. MTA, 295 Md. 88, 101, 453 A.2d 1191(1982) ("The notes or reports of a revisor or revision commission are entitled to considerable weight in ascertaining legislative intent."). See also Dean v. Pinder, 312 Md. 154, 163, 538 A.2d 1184(1988) ("It is a well-settled practice of this Court to refer to the Revisor's Notes when searching for legislative intent of an enactment.").
The inclusion of the word "personal" apparently quieted the fears of the Chamber of Commerce. Nevertheless, in the circumstances, we do not think that this action demonstrated a legislative intention to preclude compensation for emotional distress.
VII
Belcher presented two questions on her appeal to the Court of Special Appeals and we accepted them in our grant of certiorari. She asked:
(1) Is a mental condition compensable under the where there is no physical injury ?
(2) Did Belcher suffer such psychological reaction from the accidental injury sufficient to qualify as a compensable accidental personal injury ?
The first question is a matter of law. The answer is "yes" in the context of the Vance definition of "physical injury ," which we have now applied to a "personal injury" in the contemplation of the Workers' Compensation act. That is, an injury under the Act may be psychological in nature if the mental state for which recovery is sought is
capable of objective determination. Inasmuch as the circuit court decided that the answer was "no", it erred in granting the motion for summary judgment made by the employer and in denying the summary judgment made by Belcher.
The second question concerns a matter of fact. In the appeal before us, as briefed and argued by the parties, it is not disputed that, in the contemplation of the Act, Belcher was a covered employee; T. Rowe Price was her insured employer; whatever injury she suffered was personal; that the injury arose out of and in the course of her employment and was either accidental or was caused by the negligent act of a third person. So the only question remaining is whether Belcher suffered sufficient psychological reaction from the alleged injury to qualify for compensation. The question must now be resolved by the application of the Vance standard to the evidence adduced on the issue. This is best accomplished on a rehearing before the Commission, which may review the evidence presented at the first hearing and such additional evidence as the Commission deems necessary or advisable. Of course, counsel shall be afforded the opportunity to be heard. Accordingly,
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY REVERSED;
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTION TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION WITH DIRECTION TO VACATE ITS ORDER DISALLOWING PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION AND TO CONDUCT FURTHER PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO THIS OPINION;
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT.
Disposition
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTION TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION WITH DIRECTION TO VACATE ITS ORDER DISALLOWING PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION AND TO CONDUCT FURTHER PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO THIS OPINION; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT.
RODOWSKY, Judge, concurring in
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