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Faya v. Almaraz3/9/1993
tions to dismiss the complaints pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-322 on the ground that appellants had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The representatives of Dr. Almaraz asserted that the physician owed no duty to disclose his ailment as part of the doctor-patient exchange leading to informed consent. Hopkins contended, in the main, that it had no duty to investigate and ascertain Almaraz's HIV status; the hospital added that the obligations imposed by the informed consent doctrine did not extend to it in any case. The appellees further averred that the complaints were legally deficient in that appellants failed to allege that the AIDS virus entered their bodies as a result of surgery, and that the claimed injuries were not legally compensable because they rested on fear of a risk that never materialized.
The court (Kaplan, J.) dismissed both complaints in their entirety. In so doing, it concluded that Faya and the Rossis had failed to allege a legally compensable injury , and that
their counts must therefore fail as a matter of law. The court first held that appellants had failed to plead sufficient allegations of exposure to the AIDS virus. Judge Kaplan reasoned:
"Because there are no reported cases of transmission of AIDS from a surgeon to a patient, such transmission is only a theoretical possibility when proper barrier techniques are employed. . . .
Plaintiff [have] not alleged that Dr. Almaraz failed to use proper barrier techniques. Furthermore, Plaintiff [have] not alleged that any incident or accident occurred during surgery that would have caused Dr. Almaraz's blood to enter [their bodies]."
The trial court next observed that Ms. Faya and Mrs. Rossi had tested HIV-negative, that is, free of the AIDS virus, in early December 1990. Judge Kaplan thus concluded that even if the appellants had been potentially exposed to the virus, their HIV-negative status more than six months after surgery made it extremely unlikely that they will develop AIDS. Accordingly, the court deemed the injury claimed by appellants to be "the fear that something that did not happen could have happened," holding that such a fear did not represent an actionable injury for which damages might be recovered. Faya and the Rossis appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. We issued a writ of certiorari prior to intermediate appellate review to address the important and timely issues raised in these cases.
IV
A
In determining whether the trial court erred in granting the motions to dismiss, we must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaints, together with reasonable inferences properly drawn therefrom. Dismissal is proper only if the facts and allegations, so viewed, would nevertheless fail to afford plaintiff relief if proven. Berman v. Karvounis, 308 Md. 259, 264-65, 518 A.2d 726 (1987); {PA}
Page 444} Sharrow v. State Farm Mutual, 306 Md. 754, 768, 511 A.2d 492 (1986); Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 135-36, 492 A.2d 618 (1985); Ungar v State, 63 Md. App. 472, 479, 192 A.2d 1336 (1985).
We said in Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 321 Md. 642, 647, 584 A.2d 69 (1991), that "'any ambiguity or uncertainty in the allegations bearing on whether the complaint states a cause of action must be construed against the pleader,'" quoting Sharrow, supra, 306 Md. at 768. See also Berman, supra, 308 Md. at 265 ("What we c
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