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PIERCE v. CENTRAL MAINE POWER CO.3/11/1993
A.2d 524, 536 (Me. 1978). No inference can be drawn from the jury verdict in the present case that the jury disregarded the court's instruction.
IV.
CMP argues that the court abused its discretion by reversing two pretrial rulings. CMP moved in limine to admit evidence that plaintiff Nadeau was receiving full disability workers' compensation benefits in order to show that he had an incentive to prolong his disability and feign symptoms. Plaintiff Nadeau moved in limine to exclude testimony from his doctor that Nadeau had stated that he expected a sizeable settlement. After a pretrial hearing, the court granted CMP's motion to admit evidence of receipt of workers' compensation benefits and denied plaintiff Nadeau's motion to exclude the doctor's testimony. Following a final settlement conference, the court reversed both rulings on the ground that the danger of unfair prejudice
Although the justice might have stated more carefully his basis for changing his rulings, his comments do not reveal an improper reassessment of the unfairly prejudicial effect of the evidence as weighed against its probative value. A party's receipt of workers' compensation benefits, although possibly "relevant and admissible for specific limited purposes" such as their effect on plaintiff's effort to seek work and mitigate damages, poses a great danger of creating unfair prejudice if admitted. Theriault v. Swan, 558 A.2d 369, 371 n. 3 (Me. 1989). Further, Nadeau's statement to his doctor that he expected a substantial settlement had little probative value and similarly had potential for unfair prejudice. Whether resulting from an original determination or a reassessment prompted by pretrial discussions, the exclusion of the evidence did not involve an abuse of discretion. Pelkey v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., 586 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Me. 1991) (stating that evidence may be excluded, even if relevant, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice).
V.
After trial, CMP moved for a partial or full waiver of prejudgment interest, and plaintiffs requested an evidentiary hearing on the issue as provided by 14 M.R.S.A. § 1502-D (Supp. 1992). Refusing plaintiffs' request for a hearing, the court ordered that two years of prejudgment interest be waived in accordance with 14 M.R.S.A. § 1602 (Supp. 1992). The court explained the basis for its ruling as follows:
The case clearly took too long to get to trial and cost too
much money to prepare. There are a number of reasons for the
delays. New counsel did appear. Some of the defendants went
into bankruptcy . Grove took an unsuccessful interlocutory
appeal to the Law Court. It is difficult to obtain a trial date
in another busy county. The attorneys filed numerous motions
with substantial supporting memoranda. Perhaps stricter
controls by the Court were warranted. The vigorous pursuit of
Grove and the modest settlement with it resulted in Grove
supplying the working capital to allow the plaintiffs to pursue
CMP. That tactic or, at least, result added substantially to
the time to complete the case.
Plaintiffs challenge the Superior Court's disallowance of two years of prejudgment interest, contending that the court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing and abused its discretion. An evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of prejudgment interest is provided by statute "only when the judge determines that there exists a substantial need for the hearing and the amount of challenged costs or interest are substantial." 14 M.R.S.A. § 1502-D (Supp. 1992). The court in this case determined that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary " s the written material is compre
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