 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Bish v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins.3/18/1993
from that of Welter. The court in Welter focused not on the respondent's lack of control over the victim's body or the car's transmission, but on the respondent's lack of
[109 Nev. 133, Page 137]
“control over the causative factor.” Id. at 87. The court concluded that, although the respondent “may have regained full control of his car each time he stopped,” he “never regained a full measure of control over either the car's injury -inflicting potential or the situation in general.” Id. at 88. Similarly, in this case, Alderson regained dominion of the car but did not regain control over the situation. Her act of shifting gears appears to have been the result of confusion rather than control. Thus, Alderson lacked control over the “causative factor” which led to the accident in the first place.
In summary, all of the child's injuries are attributable to one proximate, uninterrupted and continuing cause: Alderson's negligence. Accordingly, respondent is liable for just one accident. Cf. United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Baggett, 258 Cal.Rptr. 52 (Ct.App. 1989) (only one accident occurred where insured's vehicle struck decedent's vehicle from behind, both parties exited their vehicles, and within a minute, a third vehicle struck the insured's vehicle from behind, fatally pinning decedent between insured's vehicle and decedent's vehicle); Kansas Fire and Cas. Co. v. Kelling, 729 S.W.2d 251 (Mo.Ct.App. 1987) (adopting “cause” theory, court held that only one accident occurred where motorist attempting to pass eastbound car collided with westbound truck and almost simultaneously hit car he was trying to pass); Truck Insurance Exchange v. Rohde, 303 P.2d 659 (Wash. 1956) (only one accident occurred where insured motorist negligently veered into oncoming three-motorcycle echelon, went out of control, and collided with each motorcycle in succession.)
Although this is a tragic case with tragic consequences, we are nevertheless compelled to conclude that the district court properly determined that the underlying circumstances constituted only a single accident for the purposes of collecting under respondent's insurance policy. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
|