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Estate of Ruben A. Hernandez v. Arizona Board of Regents11/29/1991
om the licensee has failed to request proof of age.
If we were to interpret § 4-312(B) to apply only to licensees, as appellant contends we should, we would render the words "person, firm, corporation" meaningless, thus violating the rules of statutory construction. State v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 248, 550 P.2d 626 (1976); City of Phoenix v. Yates, 69 Ariz. 68, 208 P.2d 1147 (1949). We would also ignore the apparent legislative intent to address the liability of both licensees and social hosts in a single section.
The only reasonable conclusion that we can reach from a review of the applicable statutes and the contemporaneous case law is that § 4-312(B) implicitly repealed § 4-301 by rendering it essentially redundant. Apparently the legislature, on an emergency basis, intended to provide for social host immunity at the same time that it amended the statute listing various liquor sale violations. By the next year, in a non-emergency measure, the legislature enacted a more thorough bill that enumerates specific areas of licensee liability and nonliability and that provides comprehensive immunity for social hosts, regardless of the age of the person served or furnished the alcohol.
Although we acknowledge our duty to harmonize statutes and to avoid finding that a more recent statute has implicitly repealed an earlier one, we must make such a finding when the two statutes "are so in conflict that they cannot stand together upon any reasonable construction." State ex rel. Purcell v. Superior Court, 107 Ariz. 224, 227, 485 P.2d 549, 552 (1971). We note, however, that our conclusion is consistent with the spirit of both statutes. Although § 4-301 is thereby rendered redundant, the subject that it addresses is nevertheless encompassed within § 4-312(B). The implicit repeal, therefore, does not result in any drastic alteration of the law of § 4-301; instead, its scope is merely expanded to include underage persons within the social host immunity.
VALIDITY OF § 4-312(B)
Appellant contends that if we construe § 4-312(B) to preclude appellees' liability, then the statute is unconstitutional for one of four reasons: it violates the constitutional prohibitions against abrogating a right of action to recover damages for injuries, it violates the equal protection clause, it violates the due process clause, or it violates the constitutional requirement that an act embrace a single subject.
Abrogation of Right of Action for Damages
The Arizona Constitution provides as follows:
No law shall be enacted in this State limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the death or injury of any person.
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 31. Article 18, § 6 provides:
The right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.
Appellant argues that § 4-312(B) violates both provisions of the constitution because the legislature has effectively prohibited the bringing of a cause of action. We disagree.
Although there is case law indicating that those provisions can apply to causes of action that were created after the adoption of the constitution, Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, 152 Ariz. 9, 730 P.2d 186 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029, 107 S.Ct. 1954, 9
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