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Great Plains Insurance Co. v. Angerman12/19/1991
injuries occurring during the course of repairing a vehicle and the use of that vehicle. Hence, we also conclude that such repair activities constitute a "use" of the vehicle within the meaning of § 10-4-706 of the Act.
Great Plains seeks to draw a distinction between what it terms "roadside" repairs made by the occupants of a vehicle and repairs undertaken by a person at his place of business, who is paid for his services. However, while such a distinction might properly be drawn by a legislative body, there is nothing in the present Act to indicate that the General Assembly meant to draw such a distinction; the Act treats all "pedestrians" the same, irrespective of their income-producing activity at the time of their injury .
Moreover, the failure of the Act to draw such a distinction becomes even more significant in light of the fact that other legislative bodies have incorporated a specific statutory exclusion within their "no fault" statutes similar to the exclusion contained within Great Plains' policies here. See Thornton v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra. Under such circumstances, the General Assembly's silence upon the subject may be considered as indicative of a deliberate intent not to exclude persons like defendant from coverage under the Act. See People v. Wheatridge Poker Club, 194 Colo. 15, 569 P.2d 324 (1977); Q-T Markets, Inc. v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1975).
For these reasons, we determine that defendant is entitled to recover under the terms of both policies to the extent that both policies would otherwise provide coverage for his injuries.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to it for the entry of a declaratory decree consistent with the above views.
JUDGE METZGER and JUDGE NEY concur.
Disposition
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
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