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Stillwell v. Johnson12/4/1991
Per Curiam.
The plaintiff-appellant, C. Curtis Stillwell, appeals under Civ. R. 54(B) from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants-appellees, the Archdiocese of Cincinnati ("Archdiocese") and Inpro Enterprises, Inc. ("Eastgate Honda"), in his wrongful-death action. In challenging the summary judgment, the plaintiff contends in his two assignments of error that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the following issues: (1)
On August 22, 1987, St. Mary's Church of Hyde Park, a parish of the Archdiocese, sponsored a church festival on its premises. Having presumably obtained a liquor permit, it sold beer to its patrons. Defendants Linda Sharp and Robert A. Johnson both attended. About 10:45 p.m., Johnson, who was then sixteen years of age, departed the festival on his motorcycle with a passenger seated behind him. Sharp, who had also just left the festival, was attempting to make a left turn from Observatory Avenue when Johnson attempted to pass her. His motorcycle and Sharp's vehicle collided. Johnson and his passenger were thrown from the motorcycle, which continued down Observatory Avenue and fatally injured the decedent who was walking his dog.
The plaintiff claims that a proximate cause of this collision and the decedent's death was the intoxication of Sharp and Johnson which occurred because St. Mary's workers knowingly furnished them alcohol. He argues that the breach of a duty of reasonable care owed to the decedent is founded upon common-law negligence, a violation of the dram shop statute, and other statutory violations by the Archdiocese. The Archdiocese, in maintaining that it is not liable for injuries or death off its premises under the facts as alleged, argues than plaintiff's exclusive remedies are now limited specifically to those statutory remedies set forth in R.C. 4399.01 and 4399.18.
At common law, one who sustained injury as a result of the actions of an intoxicated person could not recover from the person who actually furnished the intoxicating beverage. Settlemyer v. Wilmington Veteran's Post No. 49 (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 123, 11 OBR 421, 464 N.E.2d 521. The basis for the rule was the belief that consumption rather than sale of intoxicating liquor was the proximate cause of the injury.
In 1953, the legislature enacted a dram shop statute, R.C. 4399.01, which provided for limited liability under the following terms:
"A husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person injured in person, property, or means of support by an intoxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of a person, after the issuance and during the existence of the order of the department of liquor control prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor as defined in section 4301.0sof the Revised Code to such person, has a right of action in his own name, severally or jointly, against any person selling or giving intoxicating liquors which cause such intoxication, in whole or in part, of such person."
In Mason v. Roberts (1973), 33 Ohio St.2d 29, 62 O.O.2d 346, 294 N.E.2d 884, the Ohio Supreme Court held that R.C. 4399.01 was not the sole remedy available to an injured party against a liquor-permit holder and recognized two other exceptions to the common-law rule: (1) where the seller knew the purchaser could not refrain from drinking, and (2) where the sale violated a statute. Two statutes customarily used to invoke the second exception are R.C. 4301.22 (sales of beer or intoxicating liquor to intoxicated persons or habitual drunkards) and R.C. 4301.69 (selling or furnishing intoxicating alcohol or beer to underage persons).
Page 1 2 3 4 Ohio Personal Injury Attorneys
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