COVINGTON v. COVINGTON
12/9/1991
Heard November 5, 1991.
Decided December 9, 1991.
Sharon G. Covington (the wife) instituted this post-divorce petition against James M. Covington (the husband). The case is very interesting because it involves, inter alia, whether the husband's right of action for personal injuries resulting from
ISSUES
The issues of merit are whether the trial judge erred by (1) holding that the divorce decree foreclosed the wife's right in this post-divorce proceeding to equitable distribution of the husband's recovery for personal injuries (suffered before institution of marital litigation) in a suit instituted after the divorce; (2) sustaining an objection to testimony about the trial of the husband's case, the evidence pertaining to damages submitted therein and the recovery, all of which were proffered; and (3) failing to award the wife attorney fees.
FACTS
The husband suffered personal injuries as a result of
The divorce decree contained the following provision:
In regard to equitable distribution of the parties' marital
assets, the parties announced to the Court that this
consisted primarily of household furniture and furnishings
and the parties anticipate that an agreement can be
reached concerning these items. I find that if the parties
cannot reach an agreement concerning an equitable division
of their assets, this Court will adjudicate that issue
at the request of either party.
The appealed order held that the above provision foreclosed any claim the wife might have to the proceeds of the recovery that the husband received for his personal injuries.
During the trial of the case, the trial judge sustained an objection to testimony offered by the wife pertaining to the trial of the husband's malpractice action. The wife proffered the testimony which is of record.
ANALYSIS
I.
We hold that the trial judge erred in holding that the divorce decree foreclosed the wife's right in this post-divorce proceeding to equitable distribution of the husband's recovery in his malpractice action. Construing the divorce decree under the rules of construction applicable thereto, we hold that the quoted language of the divorce decree reserves for later determination, in the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the equitable division of the marital property.
In Petition of White, 299 S.C. 406, 385 S.E.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1989), the court stated:
As a general rule, judgments are to be construed like
other written instruments. The determinative factor is
the intent of the parties or the court, as gathered, not
from an isolated part of the contract or judgment but from
all its parts. Hence, in construing a contract or a judgment,
it should be examined and considered in its entirety;
if the language employed is plain and unambiguous, there
is no room for construction or interpretation and the effect
thereof must be declared in the light of the literal meaning
of the language used. Stanaland v. Jamison, 275 S.C. 50,
268 S.E.2d 578 (1980); 46 Am. Jur.2d Judgments Section
73 (1969); 49 C.J.S. Judgments Section 436 (1947).
The trial judge very plainly and unambiguously wrote "that if the parties cannot reach an agreement concerning an equitable division of their assets, this Court will adjudicate that issue at the request of either party." There is no limitation in this sentence. We hold that it was not the intent of the trial judge to limit the marital estate to household furniture and furnishings. We, therefore, reverse tha
Page 1 2 South Carolina Personal Injury Attorneys