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SNAVELY v. PERPETUAL FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK12/2/1991
Heard October 8, 1991.
Decided December 2, 1991.
Letitia and Wiley Snavely (the Snavelys) appeal an Order of summary judgment holding their actions against Respondent, Fant and Fant Architects (Fant and Fant), barred by the Statute of Repose, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-640 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
We affirm.
FACTS
On November 5, 1987, Letitia Snavely suffered personal injuries when she fell on a grate near the entrance to Perpetual Federal Savings Bank (Bank) in Anderson, South Carolina. The bank building and entrance, designed by Fant and Fant, was substantially completed on September 26, 1974.
The Snavelys commenced these actions, alleging Fant and Fant's negligence in designing the entryway. Trial court granted Fant and Fant summary judgment, holding the Snavelys' actions barred by the Statute of Repose in S.C. Code § 15-3-640, as they were not commenced within thirteen years of the substantial completion of the construction.
ISSUES
1. Did the legislature intend that § 15-3-640 (Cum. Supp.
1990) apply to buildings constructed prior to the effective
date of the statute?
2. Does § 15-3-640 violate equal protection and due process?
DISCUSSION
I. APPLICABILITY OF § 15-3-640
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-640 (Cum. Supp. 1990), effective May 12, 1986, provides, in part:
No actions to recover damages based upon condition of
an improvement to real property may be brought more
than thirteen years after substantial completion of such
an improvement. . .
It is undisputed that Bank was substantially completed on September 26, 1974, more than thirteen years prior to the injury . The Snavelys contend, however, that the legislature intended that § 15-3-640 apply only to buildings constructed after its effective date of May 12, 1986. We disagree.
The elementary and cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the Court "ascertain and effectuate the actual intent of the legislature." Burns v. State Farm. There is a presumption that statutory enactments are to be considered prospective rather than retroactive in their operation unless there is a specific provision of clear legislative intent to the contrary." Hercules, Inc., v. S.C. Tax Commission.
Here, we find the clear legislative intent expressed in S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-680 (Cum. Supp. 1990):
Nothing in §§ 15-3-640 through 15-3-670 of the 1976 Code
may be construed as creating any cause of action not
heretofore existing or recognized or barring any cause of
action existing or accrued on May 12, 1986. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Clearly, this provision indicates the legislative intent that § 15-3-640 be applied to buildings constructed prior to May 12, 1986.
To construe the provision otherwise would render meaningless the cited language of § 15-3-680 as, obviously, no cause of action could have existed prior to the construction of a building.
We hold the Snavely's claims barred by § 15-3-640.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION/DUE PROCESS
The Snavelys next assert that § 15-3-640 violates equal protection and due process. We disagree.
In Broome v. Truluck, we found the prior § 15-3-640 violative of equal protection. It granted architects, engineers and contractors immunity ten years after substantial completion of an improvement, while denying such protection to owners or manufacturers of component parts. We stated:
While the General Assembly has the power in passing
legislation to make a classification o
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