SNAVELY v. PERPETUAL FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK
12/2/1991
f its citizens, the
constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the law requires
that all members of a class be treated alike under
similar circumstances and conditions, and that any classification
cannot be arbitrary but must bear a reasonable
relation to the legislative purpose sought to be effected.
270 S.C. at 230, 241 S.E.2d at 740. (Citation omitted.) In Broome, we found nothing in the statute which justified the distinction between architects, engineers, and contractors, on the one hand, and owners and manufacturers, on the other.
Subsequent to Broome, the legislature revised § 15-3-640 by Act No. 412 of 1986. The revision increases the period of liability from ten years to thirteen years and extends immunity to current or prior owners and manufacturers. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-640(8), (9).
A following section, 15-3-670, provides, in part:
The limitation provided in §§ 15-3-640 through 15-3-660
may not be asserted as a defense by any person in actual
possession or control, as owner, tenant, or otherwise, of
the improvement at the time the defective or unsafe condition
constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or
death for which it is proposed to bring an action, in the
The rationale for distinguishing current possessors from architects, engineers, manufacturers, etc., was set forth in the preamble to Act No. 412 of 1986:
Whereas, the General Assembly finds it reasonable and
necessary to distinguish between a person in actual possession
or control of an improvement to real property
and those otherwise involved in an improvement to real
property, for the following reasons: because acceptance
of some future responsibility for the condition of the
premises is implied in the acceptance of an improvement
to real property; because possession or control of the
premises is a reasonable and fair basis for imposing some
additional liability; because after the date of acceptance of
the work by the owner, there exists the possibility of neglect,
abuse, poor maintenance, mishandling, improper
modification, or unskilled repair of an improvement; because
owners and persons in control have the opportunity
to avoid liability by taking care of the improvement
and by regulating its use;. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
The distinctions contained in the foregoing citation are reasonable; accordingly, we find no equal protection violation.
The Snavelys also contend that § 15-3-640 violates due process in that it "does not allow a reasonable time to bring a suit due to the fact that a victim of a statute of repose would not even know a cause of action exists until after the suit would be barred." (App's Brief, p. 11).
We recently rejected this contention in Hoffman v. Powell, relative to the medical malpractice statute of repose.
Moreover, the majority of jurisdictions have rejected due process challenges to statutes of repose governing architects' liability. Such statutes are held not to abrogate vested rights of action, but merely to prevent such rights of action, but
We concur; the judgment below is
Affirmed.
GREGORY, C.J., FINNEY and TOAL, JJ., and BRUCE LITTLEJOHN, Acting Associate Justice, concur.
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