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Sanchez v. Siemens Transmission Systems3/19/1991
other part to produce a harmonious whole. See ; . In the present situation, a review of the Workmen's Compensation Act as a whole demonstrates a legislative intent to apply post-judgment interest to final compensation orders.
For example, NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-8(B) (Cum. Supp 1990), provides that " decision of a workers' compensation judge is reviewable by the court of appeals in the manner provided for other cases...." Thus, as with workers' compensation cases evolving from the district court level, appellate review is limited to review of the final order of the WCA. See . Accordingly, we see no reason why the same rationale for allowing post-judgment interest in workers' compensation cases in district courts would not apply to administrative decisions evolving from the WCA. We note that the primary policy behind post-judgment interest is to prevent the inequity of denying the prevailing party the cost of the lost opportunity to use the money of which the judgment debtor had use during the pendency of appeal. See ; . A holding that would not extend this policy to appeals from the WCA would contravene common sense and reason, resulting in unreasonable results. See ); . Accordingly, we hold that there is a legislative intent to apply Section 56-8-4 to final compensation orders.
Further, in Candelaria v. General Electric Co., we noted that "there is nothing which indicates that Section 56-8-4(A) should not apply in workmen's compensation cases." Id. at 176, 730 P.2d at 479. Our point in Candelaria was to ensure that the policy behind post-judgment interest in non-workers' compensation cases is also applied to workers' compensation cases. Whether a final decision evolves from the district court or from the WCA is not a valid distinction and thus the policy remains unchanged. Therefore, we hold that the WCJ correctly allowed a 15% post-judgment interest from the final compensation order. Any award of post-judgment interest under the award does not commence to run, however, until the time fixed for its payment. See, e.g., .
We also address claimant's request that claimant be awarded reasonable attorney fees for the work necessitated by the employer's appeal. Claimant is not entitled attorney fees for its defense of issue three. See . However, we award claimant attorney fees in the amount of $1,000.00 for claimant's successful defense of issues one and five.
Conclusion
To conclude, we affirm the WCJ on issues one, three, and five; reverse the
WCJ's award of vocational rehabilitation benefits; and reverse and remand for a redetermination of attorney fees.
IT IS TO ORDERED.
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