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Jepson v. Cynthia Joanne New5/10/1990
taking reasonable steps to inform the court of the status of their case. This, too, will depend on the circumstances of each case. Courts may consider discovery notices, correspondence, motions and any other documents which provide the court with notice that a case is being pursued. For example, where parties are engaged in informal discovery, what will be considered reasonable steps to inform the court of the case's status will be different than where they are engaging in formal discovery because there is no requirement that the court be apprised of such discovery. Unless the court sets a status conference, it may be unaware of the progress in such litigation. In Jepson, the record reveals that the case was formally and informally active both before and after the dismissal date. The trial court was apprised of the status of the litigation by the pleadings and other documents filed such as discovery notices and the list of witnesses and exhibits. We found similar steps to be reasonable in Gorman, and we find them reasonable here.
Finally, in Jepson as in Gorman, extraordinary circumstances justify granting relief. Both actions were dismissed in the midst of active litigation, and the Rule V dismissal came after the statute of limitations had run. The Jepsons, like Gorman, lost their claims despite diligent prosecution only because of a rule of practice designed to promote expediency and efficiency but which resulted in injustice.
A party seeking relief under Rule 60(c)(6) must also establish that he acted promptly in seeking relief and that he had a meritorious claim. Gorman, supra, 152 Ariz. at 183, 731 P.2d at 78; Bickerstaff, 141 Ariz. at 631, 688 P.2d at 639. Although neither the trial court nor the court of appeals reached these issues, the record before us clearly establishes the satisfaction of both requirements. In concluding, we note Rule 60(c)(6) "vests power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice." Webb v. Erickson, 134 Ariz. 182, 186, 655 P.2d 6, 10 (1982) (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 615, 69 S.Ct. 384, 390, 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949)). Here, the denial of relief from the judgment of dismissal, entered in the midst of active litigation, undermines rather than accomplishes justice. We find that the Jepsons satisfied their burden of establishing grounds for relief under Rule 60(c)(6), and the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief. In light of this determination, we do not address the question of whether the Jepsons are entitled to relief under the savings statute.
That portion of the court of appeals decision in Jepson affirming the denial of relief under Rule 60(c) is vacated and we remand the case to the trial court with instructions to set aside the judgment of dismissal and to enter reasonable deadlines for compliance with Rule V. The decisions of the court of appeals and the trial court in Flynn are affirmed.
FELDMAN, Vice Chief Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur in the decision, with the exception of the portion of section 2 dealing with the standards for relief under Rule 60(c)(6), Ariz.R.Civ.P., 16 A.R.S., and A.R.S. § 12-504. Op. at 272-274, 792 P.2d 735-737. In that section, the court attempts to distinguish the criteria that will support relief under the rule from those justifying relief under the statute. The majority opinion actually succeeds in distinguishing Rule 60(c)(6) from A.R.S. § 12
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