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Molnar v. Malcolm Mark Law6/8/1989
CRISWELL, J.
Plaintiff, Ronald Molnar, appeals the judgment entered upon a jury verdict answering four special interrogatories in favor of defendant, Malcolm Law, upon plaintiff's claims for personal injuries arising from plaintiff's alleged attempt to rob defendant's house. We affirm.
I.
Plaintiff first contends that the evidence was insufficient to allow the application of Colo. Sess. Laws 1982, ch. 66, § 13-80-129 at 297 (reenacted as § 13-80-119, C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 6A)) as an affirmative defense to his claims of negligence and outrageous conduct. We disagree.
The statute in question limits a right of action for a personal injury received by a plaintiff "during the commission of or during immediate flight from" the commission of a felony under certain circumstances. Under its terms, the court must dismiss the action and award costs and attorney fees to the person causing the injury, if the jury determines that the party causing the injury acted:
"(I) Under a reasonable belief that physical force was reasonable and appropriate to prevent injury to himself or to others, using a degree of force which he reasonably believed necessary for that purpose; and
(II) Under a reasonable belief that physical force was reasonable and appropriate to prevent the commission of a felony, using a degree of force which he reasonably believed necessary for that purpose." section 13-80-119(2)(a), C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 6A) (identical language to predecessor statute applicable to incident at issue).
The events underlying plaintiff's action occurred in February 1983. It is undisputed that, during that incident, plaintiff and two other companions were on the defendant's property and defendant believed that they were engaged in an attempt to burglarize defendant's house. As a result, defendant confronted the plaintiff with a gun, and while he was taking plaintiff into his house to call the police, the gun discharged and plaintiff was wounded. The evidence would permit the reasonable inference either that the weapon discharged accidentally or that it was intentionally fired at plaintiff.
Plaintiff admits that the statute prohibits recovery by a plaintiff who is injured by a defendant during plaintiff's commission of, or immediate flight from, a felony, but he argues that the statute is inapplicable to an injury that is negligently inflicted after any flight is prevented and the perpetrator is seized. We conclude, however, that plaintiff reads the statute too narrowly.
The proper interpretation of a statute is control led by the intent of the legislature which adopted it. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Smith, 658 P.2d 255 (Colo. 1983). And, in interpreting a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly intended a just and reasonable result, so that its obvious legislative intent should not be defeated by judicial construction. Section 2-4-201(1)(c), C.R.S. (1980 Repl. Vol. 1B); People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986).
The legislative intendment underlying the statute here at issue is to allow a citizen to prevent the commission of a felony, or flight by the felon, by the use of physical force, so long as the citizen reasonably believes that such use is reasonable and appropriate and the degree of force used is reasonable, without incurring liability from any injury sustained by the other party. Under its provisions, it is irrelevant whether the injury is sustained as the result of the deliberate application of reasonable force or by the negligent use of physical force that is otherwis
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