Welts v. Johenning6/26/1989
hen the patient discovers or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have discovered the resulting injury, or (b) when the physician-patient relationship is terminated, whichever occurs later. Frysinger v. Leech (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 38, 512 N.E.2d 337, paragraph one of the syllabus.
Where, as in this case, a surgery patient has a date for an appointment with his physician for post-operative care and fails to keep that appointment, and declines to ever see his physician again, the physician-patient relationship is finally terminated no later than the day of the appointment which the patient failed to keep. Millbaugh v. Gilmore (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 319, 59 O.O.2d 383, 285 N.E.2d 19, paragraph one of the syllabus. In this situation, the precise point at which the physician-patient relationship terminates will be the point where the patient refuses to submit to further treatment by the physician, see Buckley v. Jefferies (Jan. 27, 1983), Cuyahoga App. No. 44724, unreported, 1983 WL 5706, or the point at which either party takes affirmative steps to terminate the relationship. See Smales v. Portman (Nov. 5, 1981), Franklin App. No. 81AP-522, unreported, 1981 WL 3576. Absent such action, the relationship is terminated by the patient's failure to keep the next scheduled appointment. Id.
Where there is a continuing course of treatment, however, the physician-patient relationship may be found to be in effect beyond the date of the missed appointment. Cf. Ishler v. Miller (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 447, 457, 10 O.O.3d 539, 544, 384 N.E.2d 296, 303. A continuing course of treatment will be found, for example, where the patient is taking prescribed medication with the knowledge of the physician and under his supervision. Id.; Kraus v. Cleveland Clinic (N.D.Ohio 1977), 442 F.Supp. 310, 314.
In light of the foregoing, the point of the termination of the physician-patient relationship, and the point at which the statute of limitations may commence to run pursuant to Frysinger v. Leech, supra, is dependent upon the conduct of the particular parties involved, and is, accordingly, a question of fact. Accord Fields v. Nilavar (June 7, 1982), Clark App. No. CA 1672, unreported; Wenning v. Syntex Corp. (July 27, 1981), Montgomery App. No. CA 6749, unreported.
In this case, construing the evidence most strongly in favor of plaintiffs as required by Civ.R. 56(C), we find that reasonable minds could reach divergensconclusions as to whether Wells refused to submit to further treatment with defendants or took any affirmative steps to terminate his relationship with defendants until he missed the appointment scheduled for March 12, 1986. Since Wells does not indicate that he actually took the medication Johenning prescribed on January 8, 1986, but rather indicated that he only considered this and the other treatment options discussed at this appointment, reasonable minds could not conclude that the physician-patient relationship continued beyond the missed appointment by a continuing course of treatment, however. Cf. Kraus v. Cleveland Clinic, supra.
In light of the foregoing, we find that the trial court improvidently granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, and we reverse. Cf. Civ.R. 56(C); Viock v. Stowe-Woodward Co. (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 7, 15, 13 OBR 8, 16, 467 N.E.2d 1378, 1387.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
PATTON, P.J., NAHRA and JOHN F. CORRIGAN, JJ., concur.
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