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HOFFMAN v. POWELL6/5/1989
Heard April 4, 1989.
Decided June 5, 1989.
The Circuit Court held that these medical malpractice actions are barred by the six-year "repose" provision of S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-545 (Supp. 1988). Appellants challenge the constitutionality of this provision. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Section 15-3-545 provides in pertinent part:
Any action to recover damages for injury to the person
arising out of any medical, surgical or dental treatment,
omission or operation by any licensed health care provider
... shall be commenced within three years from
the date of the treatment, omission or operation giving
rise to the cause of action or three years from date of
discovery or when it reasonably ought to have been
discovered, not to exceed six years from date of
occurrence.
[Emphasis supplied.]
The statute establishes a three-year limitations period running from the date the malpractice is discovered or reasonably ought to be discovered. This "discovery rule" is subject to a six-year period running from the date of occurrence. The six-year period, commonly referred to as a "statute of repose," constitutes an outer limit beyond which a
Appellants concede that, if constitutional, the six-year limitation bars their actions; they challenge its validity on equal protection and due process grounds.
ISSUE
The only issue before us is whether the six-year repose provision of § 15-3-545 violates equal protection and due process guarantees.
EQUAL PROTECTION
In Smith v. Smith, 291 S.C. 420, 354 S.E.2d 36 (1987), this Court rejected an equal protection challenge to the three-year limitations provision of § 15-3-545. We held there is a reasonable basis to protect the class of health care providers, and a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose.
Appellants contend the statute's six-year provision denies equal protection to plaintiffs whose injuries cannot be discovered within six years. We disagree. The statute of repose applies in the same manner to medical malpractice plaintiffs, whether their injuries are latent or readily apparent. Moreover, as with the three-year period in Smith, it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective: reduction of liability exposure and, thereby, fostering the delivery of quality health care services.
Courts from other jurisdictions have upheld medical malpractice statutes of repose against the equal protection challenge, identical to that here. See Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984); Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982); Valentine v. Thomas, 433 So.2d 289 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
DUE PROCESS
Appellants next contend the statute of repose violates due process by barring a potential claim before a plaintiff has knowledge, directly or by exercise of due care, that an injury has been inflicted. We disagree.
The Supreme Court of Illinois addressed a similar contention in Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill.2d 295, 37 Ill. Dec. 558, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979):
Although such a result — a cause of action barred before
its discovery — seems harsh and unfair, the reasonableness
of the statute must be judged in light of the
circumstances confronting the legislature and the end
which it sought to accomplish. We have noted above
that various reports, commissions, and authors recommended
that the "long tail" exposure to malpractice
claims brought about by the discovery rule be curtailed
by placing an outer time limit within which a malpractice
Page 1 2 South Carolina Personal Injury Attorneys
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