 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Hernandez v. Woodard11/4/1993
). See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(c) (1982).
As pertinent here, at the time of plaintiff's accident, the No-Fault Act provided that a person injured in an automobile accident could not recover against an owner or operator of a motor vehicle for damages for bodily injury unless the accident caused a reasonable need for medical services having a reasonable value in excess of $2,500. Section 10-4-714(1)(e), C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 4A).
In Pistora v. Rendon, 765 P.2d 1089 (Colo. App. 1988), a division of this court interpreted the Act, as pertinent here, to require that an action for personal injuries incurred in an automobile accident could not be "maintained' unless the plaintiff's medical expenses exceeded $2,500. The court in Pistora further declared that dismissal without prejudice was "the appropriate penalty" for filing such an action before the $2,500 threshold had been reached.
This decision was expressly overruled by Jones v. Cox, supra, on April 6, 1992, which was after the county court trial and after defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's response had been filed in this case. Prior to that date, Pistora was the governing authority on this issue, and plaintiff was thus precluded from asserting his personal injury claim in the county court proceeding. See Martin v. District Court, 191 Colo. 107, 550 P.2d 864 (1976) (a court of appeals opinion selected for official publication is the law of the state and should be followed until it is reversed or overruled).
Accordingly, we conclude that the then-existing case law constituted an impediment to plaintiff's ability to obtain relief on his personal injury claim when the first action was brought in county court. We therefore conclude that the trial court should have applied an exception to the res judicata bar and permitted plaintiff to pursue his subsequent and timely action on the personal injury claim. See Taub v. McClelland-Colt Commission Co., supra; Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(c) (1982).
In view of our resolution of this issue, we consider it unnecessary to address plaintiff's other contentions.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
JUDGE DAVIDSON and JUDGE BRIGGS concur.
Disposition
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
|