 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Simon v. Coppola11/4/1993
urer) as determined by the jury. This is because the "contract" exception to § 13-21-111.6, the collateral source statute, precludes application of that statute to the Coppola settlement, even if the statute were otherwise applicable. I further agree that only § 13-50.5-105 applies to the Coppola settlement and that, because the jury attributed 0% fault to Coppola, pursuant to § 13-50.5-105 the manufacturer is entitled to no offset because of Coppola's involvement in the case.
I write separately because, in my view, the collateral source statute does not apply to the Coppola settlement agreement, without regard to the statute's "contract" exception. I also write separately to emphasize why the reconciliation of these statutes urged by the manufacturer, in addition to ignoring the historical context of the statutes, would lead to arbitrary and inequitable result and would contravene important public policies.
I.
Section 13-21-111.6, the collateral source statute, provides in relevant part that the court must reduce the verdict by the amount by which the plaintiff has been indemnified or compensated by another "in relation to the injury , damage, or death sustained." The statute itself refers to a reduction for the amount of a payment from another "in relation to" the injury - not from another who otherwise may be "liable in tort," as provided in 13-50.5-105. This choice of wording does not compel the Conclusion that § 13-21-111.6 should apply not only to payments from a collateral source independent of any wrongdoing but also to compensation paid to avoid the risk of being found "liable in tort."
As our supreme court has recognized, because the scope of § 13-21-111.6 is not entirely clear, we must look beyond its language to determine the construction most in accordance with the General Assembly's intent. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1986). To reach the Conclusion urged by the manufacturer that the statute applies to those who have settled a tort claim but are assigned no fault at trial, we would again have to ignore the statute's historical context.
Section 13-21-111.6 was enacted to restrict the scope of the "collateral source" rule in Colorado. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, supra. Colorado law had previously provided that compensation or indemnity received by an injured party from a "collateral source," that is, a source "wholly independent of the wrongdoer," and to which the wrongdoer had not contributed, would not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer. Kistler v. Halsey, 173 Colo. 540, 545, 481 P.2d 722, 724 (1971); see 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 566 (1988).
Benefits from "collateral sources" have historically included payments from insurance policies, employee benefits, gratuities, and social legislation. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A comment c (1979). What have not been considered payments from a collateral source are payments made in compensation for the injury in order to avoid exposure to being found liable in tort at trial. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 885 comment f (1979).
Further, understood in its historical context, it is not necessary to apply § 13-21-111.6 to such a settlement merely because the statute was enacted in part to avoid the problem of "double recovery." See U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Salida Gas Service Co., 793 P.2d 602 (Colo. App. 1989). The principle of prevent
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Colorado Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|