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Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe11/24/1993
this Court, for all intents and purposes, reversed Coady in our holding in Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hospital (1966), 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469. In Johnson, we criticized Coady, impliedly overruled it and noted that in 84 years the holding was never cited and that on the facts it was clearly distinguishable from Johnson. This Court, in Grey v. Silver Bow County (1967), 149 Mont. 213, 425 P.2d 819, cited the Johnson case, and upheld the discovery rule in a medical malpractice case. So that there is no question on what Johnson held, we clarify the record and conclude that Johnson overruled the Coady decision.
We find no merit in respondent's argument that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. Section 27-2-216, MCA, is presumed constitutional. See Montana Milk Control Board v. Rehberg (1962), 141 Mont. 149, 376 P.2d 508. Respondent must prove the unconstitutionality "beyond a reasonable doubt." Here, respondent has failed to meet that burden.
We hold that the plain language of § 27-2-216(1)(b), MCA, expressly allows the appellant to bring claims for childhood sexual abuse within three years of discovering that the injuries were allegedly caused by the abuse. The statute clearly overturns the rationale of our holding in E.W. and coincides with this Court's suggestion that the legislature is the proper body to change the law. The plain meaning of the statute cannot lead to an interpretation that the respondent suggests, which is the appellant's action accrued upon her awareness of the injury and there is no requirement of discovery of the cause of the injury.
Courts throughout the country have applied the discovery rule to cases where plaintiffs were aware of the sexual assaults at or before the age of majority, but were unaware of the causal connection between the abuse and the physical and psychological problems they encountered. Annotation, Running of Limitations Against Action for Civil Damages for Sexual Abuse of Child, 9 A.L.R. 5th 321, 343-47 (1993). In so holding, these courts have structured a broad interpretation of the discovery rule, which tolls the running of the statute until there is: 1) a discovery of the injury ; and 2) a discovery of the cause of the injury. See Annotation, Running of Limitations Against Action for Civil Damages for Sexual Abuse of Child, 9 A.L.R. 5th 321, 343-47 (1993).
We note that the discovery doctrine relied on in E.W. predated the legislative enactment of the statute of limitation of § 27-2-216, MCA, which extends the statute of limitation until "3 years after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury was caused by the act of sexual abuse." Here, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to when the appellant knew or should have known of her injury and its cause.
We reverse the District Court's ruling of summary judgment and remand the case for trial.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE, JUSTICES GRAY, HUNT, TRIEWEILER, NELSON and WEBER concur.
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