Was the Statute of Repose contained in S.C. Code
    Ann. § 15-3-545 (Supp. 1992) tolled by S.C.
    Code Ann. § 15-3-30 (1976) when [the
    Defendant] Dr. Pierce moved from South Carolina in
    1984?



In 1979 and 1980, Defendant Dr. Pierce, a resident of South Carolina, removed two lesions from Plaintiff's (Langley's) leg, which lesions he diagnosed benign. In 1984, he moved to Florida. In 1990, a third lesion removed from Langley's leg was diagnosed malignant; the pathologist examining the 1990 sample determined that the 1979 and 1980 lesions, at the time of their removal by Dr. Pierce, were malignant.




In 1991, Mrs. Langley filed her diversity suit in Federal District Court.




District Court granted Dr. Pierce summary judgment, holding that § 15-3-545(A), the six-year statute of repose for medical malpractice, barred the claim. Langley appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, contending that the six-year statute of repose in § 15-3-545(A) was tolled by § 15-3-30 when Dr. Pierce moved from South Carolina in 1984. The question was certified by the Fourth Circuit to this Court. 994 F.2d 36.




ISSUE




When a defendant is continuously absent from South Carolina, does § 15-5-30 toll the ultimate repose provision contained in § 15-3-545?




DISCUSSION




Section 15-3-545(A) (Supp. 1990), the statute of repose governing medical malpractice actions accruing after April, 1988, provides:




  any action . . . to recover damages for  injury  to the
  person arising out of any medical . . . treatment,
  omission, or operation . . . must be commenced within
  three years from the date of the treatment, omission,
  or operation giving rise to the cause of action or
  three years from date of discovery or when it
  reasonably ought to have been discovered, not to
  exceed six years from date of occurrence or as tolled
  by this section. (Emphasis supplied).


Section 15-3-30 (1976), the tolling statute, § 15-3-30 (1976), provides:




   f when a cause of action shall accrue against any
  person he shall be out of the State, such action
  may be commenced within the terms in this chapter
  respectively limited after the return of such person
  into this State. And if, after such cause of action
  shall have accrued, such person shall depart from and
  reside out of this State . . . for the space of one
  year or more, the time of his absence shall not be
  deemed or taken as any part of the time limited for
  the commencement of such action. (Emphasis supplied).



Langley contends that inclusion of the language "in this chapter" renders the tolling statute applicable to claims under § 15-3-545. We disagree.




The "primary function in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature." Browning v. Hartvigsen, 307 S.C. 122, 414 S.E.2d 115, 117 (1992). Generally, specific laws prevail over general laws, and later legislation takes precedence over earlier legislation. Lloyd v. Lloyd, 295 S.C. 55, 367 S.E.2d 153 (1988).




Here, § 15-3-545 specifically provides that an action for 


Moreover, this Court has recognized that the six-year repose provision in § 15-3-545 "constitutes an outer limit beyond which a 


In discussing the distinction between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held:




  A statute of limitations is a procedural device that
  operates as a defense to limit the remedy ava

Page 1 2 
South Carolina Personal Injury Attorneys
						  
						Personal Injury Lawyers