LANGLEY v. PIERCE
11/8/1993
ilable
from an
First United Methodist Church v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 865-866 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070, 110 S.Ct. 113, 107 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1990). The Court held, further, that "a statute of repose is typically an absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer exists and is not tolled for any reason because to do so would upset the economic balance struck by the legislative body." Id. (citing Knox v. AC&S. Inc., 690 F. Supp. 752, 759 [S.D. Ind. (1988)].
Similarly, in Kissel v. Rosenbaum, 579 N.E.2d 1322 (Ind. App. 1st Dist. 1991), involving a 10-year outside limitation in which to bring suit for defects in construction, the Court discussed the rationale for statutes of repose:
A statute of repose constitutes a substantive
definition of rights rather than a procedural
limitation provided by a statute of limitation.
See Bolick v. American Barmag Corp.,
306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982).
Statutes of repose are based upon considerations of
the economic best interests of the public as a whole
and are substantive grants of immunity based upon a
legislative balance of the respective rights of
potential plaintiffs and defendants struck by
determining a time limit beyond which liability no
longer exists.
Society benefits when claims and causes are laid to
rest after having been viable for reasonable time.
When causes of action are extinguished after such
time, society generally may continue its business and
personal relationships in peace, without worry that
some cause of action may arise to haunt it because of
some long-forgotten act or omission. This is not only
for the convenience of society but also due to
necessity. At that point, society is secure and
stable.
579 N.E.2d at 1326-1328.
This Court has previously upheld tolling provisions against absent defendants. See Parker v. S.C. Public Service Comm'n, 285 S.C. 231, 328 S.E.2d 909 (1985); Cutino v. Ramsey, 285 S.C. 74, 328 S.E.2d 72 (1985); Harris v. Dunlap, 285 S.C. 226, 328 S.E.2d 908 (1985). However, each of these cases involved a statute of limitations, not one of repose.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the statute of repose contained in ยง 15-3-545 (Supp. 1992) was not tolled when Dr. Pierce moved from South Carolina in 1984.
Certified question answered.
HARWELL, C.J., and FINNEY, TOAL and MOORE, JJ., concur.
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