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Bond v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co.6/3/1993
ptcy deprived the trial court of jurisdiction for purposes of § 13-21-402(2).
An action commenced in state court can, in some circumstances, be continued after a petition in bankruptcy has been filed. For example, the bankruptcy court may dismiss a petition filed by a corporation under chapter 7, in which case the stay would be lifted and a civil action previously filed in state court could proceed. See 11 U.S.C. § 707 (1988).
We therefore agree that "a stay of a suit pending in another court against the bankrupt is not a dismissal of the suit nor does it deprive the court of jurisdiction over the matter; it merely suspends the proceedings." David v. Hooker, LTD., 560 F.2d 412, 418 (9th Cir. 1977); see Hill v. Harding, 107 U.S. 631, 2 S.Ct. 404, 27 L.Ed. 493 (1882); 1A Collier on Bankruptcy § 11.07 (J. Moore & L. King 14th ed. 1977). (The similar section on duration of stay in 2 Collier on Bankruptcy § 362.06 (L. King 15th ed. 1993) does not contain this specific proposition, but in our view it continues to be a correct statement of law. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a) and 362(c) (1988)).
As a result, it is unnecessary to address the Hospitals' separate contention that they were not principal distributors or sellers subject to liability under § 13-21-402(2).
II. Defendant DuPont
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, DuPont did not owe plaintiffs a duty either in strict liability or negligence. In the circumstances presented here, we disagree.
A. Strict Liability
Plaintiffs contend that DuPont is strictly liable as a component part manufacturer of the Implant based on two separate theories. The first is that DuPont manufactured and sold a product unreasonably dangerous when incorporated into Vitek's product. The second is that DuPont as a seller is subject to strict liability under §§ 13-21-401 and 13-21-402, C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 6A) because it was a "seller" with "actual knowledge" of the "defect."
1. Design Defect
It is undisputed that DuPont played no role in the design or manufacture of the Implant, and thus, it cannot be held liable as a manufacturer of the final product. Plaintiffs also do not contest that Vitek designed, manufactured, and sold its Implant subject to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, see 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1988), and implementing regulations. See 21 C.F.R. § 860 et seq. (1992). Plaintiffs nevertheless claim that DuPont knew or should have known that Vitek's product, with Teflon incorporated into it, was unreasonably dangerous and that DuPont thus had a duty to warn physicians and their patients of the possible dangers or to refrain from selling Teflon to Vitek. We disagree.
A component-part manufacturer or raw-material supplier has no duty to foresee all the dangers that may result from the use of a final product which contains its component part or materials. See Shaw v. General Motors Corp., 727 P.2d 387 (Colo. App. 1986). This is true even if the manufacturer or supplier has knowledge of the design and use of the final product. Childress v. Gresen Manufacturing Co., 888 F.2d 45, 49 (6th Cir. 1989)("Such a standard would be contrary to public policy, as it would encourage ignorance on the part of component part manufacturers or alternatively require them to 'retain an expert in the client's field of business to determine whether the client intends to develop a safe product.'").
A manufacturer of component parts or supplier of raw materials can be held strictly liable based on a claim of design defect or failure t
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