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Bond v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co.6/3/1993
o warn only if (1) the materials or component parts are in a defective condition or without a warning are unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; (2) the product is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold; (3) the design defect or failure to warn is the cause of the plaintiff's injury; (4) the defendant sold the product and is in the business of selling such products; and (5) plaintiff sustained damages as a result. Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978).
Defects alleged in design, including a failure to warn, are not easily attributed to one component part, group of parts, or the final product. See Union Supply Co. v. Pust, supra. ... The difficulty is due in part to the fact that the determination of the existence of such a "defect" turns on a risk-benefit or equivalent analysis of what constitutes an unreasonable danger. See Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168 (Colo. 1993).
Nevertheless, a plaintiff must present evidence from which a jury could find that any "defect" was in the "design" of the component part, not the final product. See Union Supply Co. v. Pust, supra. Thus, the focus of analysis is on whether the component parts or raw materials were unreasonably dangerous as a result of a failure to warn or other design defect at the time of delivery to the manufacturer of the final product. See Shaw v. General Motors Corp., supra.
Here, plaintiffs do not contest that Teflon is safe for multiple uses. There is no evidence that Teflon has any "inherent dangers" generally unknown to purchasers such as would expose DuPont to liability for failure to warn of an unreasonably dangerous condition. See Shaw v. General Motors Corp., supra. Any danger resulted from the manufacture and particular use of the Implant as a final product which contained DuPont's raw material as a component part.
Courts in other jurisdictions which have addressed similar claims against DuPont have for similar reasons concluded that it is not liable for the injuries caused by Vitek's product. See Miller v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours And Co., 811 F. Supp. 1286, 1287 (E.D.Tenn. 1992) ("The plaintiffs have not provided any evidence tending to show that the [Teflon] fibers and resins the defendant supplied to Vitek were in any manner defective or unsafe."); Anguiano v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours And Co., 808 F. Supp. 719, 725-26 (D.Ariz. 1992)("In this case, [Teflon] is not inherently harmful. The harm arose from the manner in which was used. . . . [Teflon] was not defective or unreasonably dangerous when sold to Vitek, which means that DuPont did not have a duty to warn even Vitek about [Teflon]. This means that DuPont also did not have a duty to warn plaintiffs.").
We agree with these decisions and conclude the trial court properly found as a matter of law that there was nothing unreasonably dangerous or unsafe about Teflon which required DuPont to provide a warning to the ultimate users or consumers or to refrain from selling its product to Vitek. See Eggert v. Mosler Safe Co., 730 P.2d 895 (Colo. App. 1986); Shaw v. General Motors Corp., supra; Childress v. Gresen Manufacturing Co., supra.
2. Seller With Actual Knowledge
A seller is deemed to be a manufacturer subject to strict liability if the seller "has actual knowledge of a defect in a product . . . ." Section 13-21-401. Plaintiffs assert that DuPont knew Vitek intended to use the Teflon in a way that was unreasonably dangerous and that, consequently, DuPont should be held strictly liable. We disagre
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