 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Riley v. American Honda Motor Co.6/22/1993
precautions to avoid the injury. 63 Am.Jur.2d, Products Liability, §§ 356-57 (1984); 9 American Law of Products Liability 3d, § 32:76 (1987). While we have not expressly stated this proposition, we have relied on such evidence in determining whether sufficient evidence supported a finding that a failure to warn was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. In Krueger v. General Motors Corp. (1989), 240 Mont. 266, 783 P.2d 1340, plaintiff was injured while removing the front drive shaft from a General Motors four-wheel drive pickup truck. Parked on a sloping driveway and engaged in "park," the pickup rolled over plaintiff. The pickup was equipped with a newly designed transfer case which caused the pickup to act differently while engaged in park than a pickup equipped with a conventional transfer case. The jury found that General Motors' failure to warn of the difference was a proximate cause of the injuries.
On appeal, we determined that substantial evidence supported the jury's finding of proximate cause. Krueger, 783 P.2d at 1348. Integral to our determination was plaintiff's testimony that he would have altered his method of repairing the truck had he been warned that a pickup equipped with the new transfer case would not behave like a conventional four-wheel drive pickup; other witnesses injured under similar circumstances testified to the same effect. Krueger, 783 P.2d at 1348. We examine the record before us, then, to determine whether Riley presented evidence analogous to that which we relied on in Krueger — evidence establishing that a warning relating to the motorcycle's alleged propensity to wobble would have altered Riley's conduct.
Our review of the record indicates that Riley failed to establish a causal relationship between the lack of a warning and his injury . Unlike the plaintiff in Krueger, Riley did not testify that he would have altered his conduct had he been warned of the motorcycle's alleged propensity to wobble; nor did he present other witnesses to testify to that effect. He does not contend that he presented any direct testimony on causation.
Rather, Riley relies solely on his general testimony that he respected machinery and was concerned about safety to meet the causation element. Based on this testimony, he suggests that he "might have rode the motorcycle differently and might not have taken it on a long trip on the highway" had warnings been given. This suggestion is not supported by evidence of record, however. Nor is it analogous to the testimony on which we relied to support a causal relationship between the lack of warning and injury in Krueger; there, plaintiff unequivocally testified that a warning "would have" altered his conduct.
Considering the evidence presented by Riley in a light most favorable to him, we find no evidence upon which reasonable minds could conclude that a failure to warn of the alleged propensity to wobble was the cause of the accident and injuries. Without such evidence, Riley failed to present a prima facie failure to warn claim.
In the absence of evidence establishing a causal link between the failure to warn and the accident and injuries, Riley urges this Court to apply a rebuttable presumption of causation. Under this approach to failure to warn claims, the causation element is satisfied by a presumption that a warning would be read and heeded. Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (Kan. 1984), 681 P.2d 1038, 1057. A number of jurisdictions rely on Comment j to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) as a basis for such a rebuttable presumption. Comment j provides in pertinent part:
In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably d
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Montana Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|