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Riley v. American Honda Motor Co.6/22/1993
ufacturer is consistent with the policy behind strict liability. It would encourage manufacturers to provide safe products and to warn of the known dangers in the use of the products which might cause injury. It would also discourage any manufacturer from risking liability when he could have provided a warning, even if he felt that such warning would impair the salability of his product. See Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Natl. Bk., 332 N.E.2d 820. The rebuttable presumption has been overwhelmingly supported in recent cases. See Walsh v. Ford Motor Co. (D.D.C. 1985), 106 F.R.D. 378; Knowlton v. Deseret Medical, Inc. (1st Cir. 1991), 930 F.2d 116, 123; Plummer v. Lederle Laboratories (2nd Cir. 1987), 819 F.2d 349; Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories (5th Cir. 1974), 498 F.2d 1264, 1281; Petty v. United States (8th Cir. 1984), 740 F.2d 1428, 1437; Brazzell v. United States (N.D. Iowa 1985), 633 F. Supp. 62, 72; Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co. (Mass. App. 1978), 376 N.E.2d 143, 147; and Snawder v. Cohen (W.D.Ky. 1990), 749 F. Supp. 1473.
The case of Kruger v. General Motors Corp. (1989), 240 Mont. 266, 783 P.2d 1340, is not analogous to this case. In Kruger there was no request for the presumption, nor was rebuttable presumption an issue in the case. The rebuttable presumption was not needed, nor raised, nor discussed. In this case it has been specifically raised.
The District Court erred in directing a verdict and I would reverse and remand for a new trial on the cause of action of a failure to warn.
JUSTICES HUNT and TRIEWEILER join in the foregoing dissent.
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