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Robinson v. General Mills Restaurants Inc.6/15/1993
nd such dismissal. Id. In those instances, the second dismissal acts as a final adjudication, a fact that supports our holding that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice can act as a final adjudication under certain circumstances.
During the year following the filing of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, such dismissal is not a final adjudication of the case. See Hensley v. Henry, 61 Ohio St. 2d 277, 400 N.E.2d 1352 (1980). We hold, however, that once the one-year period for refiling an action has elapsed and the action can no longer be resurrected, the voluntary dismissal acts as a final adjudication for purposes of Rule 60(b).
In the case before us, when plaintiffs filed their Rule 60(b) motion, a year had elapsed since the first notice was filed. In addition, the applicable statute of limitations had run. We believe that at that time the voluntary dismissal was a final adjudication for purposes of a Rule 60 motion.
A motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60 is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Sink v. Easter, 288 N.C. 183, 198, 217 S.E.2d 532, 541 (1975). There are several grounds for relief under a Rule 60(b) motion. Indeed, another panel of this Court has labeled Rule 60(b) as "a grand reservoir of equitable power." Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Peartree, 28 N.C. App. 709, 712, 222 S.E.2d 706, 708 (1976). In the instant case, although we could speculate on grounds for relief, we cannot determine what the trial Judge had in mind when he indicated that he would grant relief if he had the authority to do so.
We do know, however, that in so ruling, he failed to comprehend his authority under the law. Where a trial court, under a misapprehension of the law, has failed to exercise its discretion regarding a discretionary matter, that failure amounts to error which requires reversal and remand. Lemons v. Old Hickory Council, 322 N.C. 271, 277, 367 S.E.2d 655, 658, reh'g denied, 322 N.C. 610, 370 S.E.2d 247 (1988). In determining that it had no authority to act on plaintiffs' Rule 60 motion, the Forsyth County court {PA}
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{/PA}638 misapprehended the law, and its denial of plaintiffs' motion on that basis was error. Accordingly, we reverse the 30 August 1991, order and remand to Forsyth County Superior Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Before further action on its part, the Montgomery County court must await the Forsyth County court's determination of plaintiffs' Rule 60 motion.
Reversed and remanded.
Judges Eagles and Orr concur.
Disposition
Reversed and remanded.
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