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Lopez v. Merit Ins. Co.6/9/1993
(Emphasis added.) NRS 12.130(2) further provides that an intervenor may join the
[109 Nev. 553, Page 556]
plaintiff “in claiming what is sought,” or may join the defendant “in resisting the claims of the plaintiff.” The plain language of NRS 12.130 clearly indicates that intervention is appropriate only during ongoing litigation, where the intervenor has an opportunity to protect or pursue an interest which will otherwise be infringed. The plain language of NRS 12.130 does not permit intervention subsequent to the entry of a final judgment.
Our prior decisions support this conclusion. In Ryan v. Landis, 58 Nev. 253, 75 P.2d 734 (1938), the trial court granted appellant permission to intervene almost one year after judgment, but this order was later vacated. Id. at 258-59, 75 P.2d at 735. This court, citing the predecessor to NRS 12.130, affirmed an order vacating the order granting intervention, finding that intervention was necessarily “not before trial, as the statute provides.” Id. at 259, 75 P.2d at 735. This court stated that “in all cases [intervention] must be made before trial.” Id. (quoting Kelly v. Smith, 268 P. 1057, 1059 (Cal. 1928)); see McLaney v. Fortune Operating Co., 84 Nev. 491, 499, 444 P.2d 505, 510 (1968) (“ he lower court allowed [appellants] to intervene . . . subsequent to the trial and after judgment. The motion to intervene came too late and should have been denied.”).
In refusing to allow intervention subsequent to the entry of final judgment, this court has not distinguished between judgments entered following trial and judgments entered by default or by agreement of the parties. Ryan, 58 Nev. at 259-60, 75 P.2d at 735. In Ryan, this court stated: The intervention must be made before the trial commences. After the verdict all would admit it would be too late to intervene. But a voluntary agreement of the parties stands in the place of a verdict, and, as between the parties to the record as fully and finally determines the controversy as a verdict could do. . . . It is not the intention of the statute that one not a party to the record shall be allowed to interpose and open up and renew a controversy which has been settled between the parties to the record, either by verdict or voluntary agreement.
[109 Nev. 553, Page 557]
Id. at 260, 75 P.2d at 735 (quoting Henry, Lee & Co. v. Cass County Mill & Elevator Co., 42 Iowa 33 (1875)).
Merit suggests that a final judgment must be satisfied before intervention becomes improper and cites Eckerson v. Rudy, 72 Nev. 97, 295 P.2d 399 (1956), for this proposition. In Eckerson, this court affirmed the trial court's order denying intervention subsequent to the entry of a default judgment. Id. at 98, 295 P.2d at 399. At the time intervention was sought, the parties had settled the case, the defendant had consented to entry of default, default judgment had been entered, and the judgment had been satisfied. Id. at 99, 295 P.2d at 399. The proposed intervenors nevertheless believed the default judgment was improperly entered and sought to intervene in order to set aside the judgment. Id. This court found that “ his they may not do by intervention where the controversy already is ended and settled to the satisfaction of the parties litigant.” Id., 295 P.2d at 400. Contrary to Merit's assertions, in Eckerson, we simply determined that public policy militates even more strongly against allowing intervention subsequent to the entry of judgment where the judgment has not only been entered but also satisfied. Eckerson is consistent with Ryan and NRS 12.130 in proscribing intervention subsequent to the entry of a final judgment. The district court therefore erred in
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