 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Voight v. Colorado Mountain Club8/1/1991
586 P.2d 246 (1978). Thus, if the jury were informed of the availability of pre-judgment interest, it could adversely affect two of the underlying purposes of the interest statute, i.e., to compensate the damaged party for the loss of the use of the money and to encourage the settlement of cases.
Furthermore, informing the jury about pre-judgment interest creates the real possibility that, contrary to the statutory directive, the jury will lessen its award and thereby nullify the legislative intent to provide such interest. See Callaham v. Slavsky, 153 Colo. 291, 385 P.2d 674 (1963).
CMC implicitly concedes it would be improper to inform the jury about pre-judgment interest as it pertains to non-economic losses. But, the economic loss claims of Voight were only one aspect of her total claim for damages. Because of her overnight exposure to the severe weather, parts of both of plaintiff's feet, including her toes, were amputated. Thus, her economic loss claims were less than half of her total damage award.
Cross-examination of an economist about pre-judgment interest for economic losses would indicate to the jury that pre-judgment interest for non-economic damages also existed. Providing this information to the jury would be contrary to § 13-21-101's mandate that pre-judgment interest is to be added to the verdict by the trial court only after the damage award.
V.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to compel answers to deposition questions of the plaintiff. During plaintiff's deposition, she was questioned by defense counsel about conversations with her husband. Plaintiff objected to these questions on the basis that the information they sought was protected by the marital privilege of § 13-90-107(1)(a), C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 6A). The defendant moved unsuccessfully to compel the answers to these questions.
Citing Petro-Lewis Corp. v. District Court, 727 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1986), defendant argues that the validity and scope of the marital privilege has been seriously questioned. Defendant argues that we should narrowly construe the privilege and should, therefore, determine that the trial court erred in not requiring plaintiff to answer defense counsel's questions about her conversations with her husband concerning this incident. We disagree.
In our view, the recent decisions of our supreme court interpreting § 13-90-107(1)(a) do not narrowly construe the marital privilege. See Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Hood, 802 P.2d 458 (Colo. 1990); In re Marriage of Bozarth, 779 P.2d 1346 (Colo. 1989); People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1987).
We conclude that none of the exceptions to the marital privilege stated in § 13-90-107(1)(a) are applicable here, and thus, the trial court properly prohibited defense counsel from inquiring into conversations between plaintiff and her husband.
The other contentions of the parties' are without merit.
The dismissal of the punitive damages claim is affirmed, the judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to reinstate the jury verdict and enter judgment thereon.
Disposition
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CAUSE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
|