Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co.3/7/1990
` hen legislative authority is exerted within a proper area, it need not embrace every conceivable problem within that field. The Legislature may Proceed one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. * * *'" Jewel Cos., Inc. v. Burlington (1974), 365 Mass. 274, 279, 311 N.E. 2d 539, 542, quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Atty. Gen. (1972), 361 Mass. 401, 417, 280 N.E. 2d 406, 417. The General Assembly is not required, under the rubric of equal protection, to choose between dealing with all aspects of a problem or not dealing with it at all. Dandridge v. Williams (1970), 397 U.S. 471, 486-487. Where, as here, the classifications made by the General Assembly are rational and not arbitrary, the requirements of equal protection are satisfied. Accord Hartford Fire Ins. Co., supra, at 1373, fn. 15.Here, as in the area of due process, this court "may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirabil-
ity of legislative policy determinations * * *; in the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment. * * *" (Emphasis added.) City of New Orleans v. Dukes (1976), 427 U.S. 297, 303-304.
We hold that R.C. 2305.131 does not violate the equal protection guarantees of the Ohio and United States Constitutions by limiting the liability of architects and builders without corresponding limits on the liability of occupiers of improvements to real property and materialmen supplying materials used in the construction of such improvements. Because we also have held that the statute does not violate either the due process or right-to-a-remedy provisions of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, we thus affirm the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., WRIGHT and H. BROWN, JJ., concur.
RESNICK, J., concurs in the syllabus and judgment only.
SWEENEY and DOUGLAS, JJ., dissent.
DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides in relevant part:
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay." (Emphasis added.)
Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution is clear and unambiguous. The courthouse doors are to be open to an individual who suffers an injury to his person. The individual has a right to a remedy for his injuries and to have justice administered without denial.
In the case at bar, Sedar suffered severe injuries to his person. However, Sedar was denied a remedy for his injuries because R.C. 2305.131, a statute of repose, effectively barred his pursuit of a remedy before his injuries even occurred.
The majority attempts to distinguish the present case from our recent analysis of Section 16, Article I in the context of the four-year repose statute for medical malpractice actions, R.C. 2305.11(B). In doing so, the majority states that the medical-repose statute takes away an existing actionable claim before the injured party discovered his claim and, therefore, denies a legal remedy to one who has suffered injury to his person, thereby violating Section 16, Article I. In contrast, says the majority, R.C. 2305.131 does not take away an existing cause of action from Sedar but, rather, prevents the cause of action from ever arising. Hence, reasons the majority, denial of a future legal reme
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