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Newburn v. RFB Petroleum Inc.5/18/1989
RFB Petroleum, Inc., and Robert F. Brown, judgment debtors, appeal a district court order denying their claim that certain funds garnisheed by plaintiff, Thomas Newburn, are exempt from garnishment. They assert the funds are exempt under § 13-54-102(1)(q), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 6), as being traceable to an award under a crime victim's reparation law. We affirm.
The funds at issue were derived from a federal court order entered in a criminal prosection in which the defendant in that proceeding pled guilty to a number of crimes arising out of a fraudulent scheme to sell tax shelters. The federal court entered a judgment of conviction and, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1986), ordered the defendant, as a condition of probation, to "make full restitution to defrauded investors . . . ." The court further ordered that all such funds which were paid pursuant to its order were to be administered by a receiver for the benefit of the defrauded investors. The judgment debtors were among the defrauded investors, and thus, they were entitled to a pro-rata share of the restitution paid into the court.
In order to collect on a separate civil judgment, plaintiff served writs of garnishment on the court-appointed receiver seeking to attach the judgment debtors' share of the restitution fund. The judgment debtors filed a claim of exemption, asserting that the funds are exempt from garnishment under § 13-54-102(1)(q), and urging that the exemptions provided in § 13-54-102 are available to corporate debtors as well as individuals. The trial court disagreed and denied the claim of exemption.
The determinative issue on appeal is whether an order of restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3651 is an "award under a crime victim's reparation law" within the meaning of § 13-54-102(1)(q), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 6). We hold that the General Assembly intended the exemption to cover only an award under a statute like the Uniform Crime Victims Reparation Act, 11 Uniform Laws Annot. 35 (1974), and that since 18 U.S.C. § 3651 is not a similar statute, the district court properly denied the judgment debtors' claim of exemption.
A substantial number of states have either adopted the Uniform Crime Victims Reparation Act or have enacted similar statutes. See 24-4.1-101, et seq., C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 10A)(Colorado Crime Victims Compensation Act). These statutes, while varying in many respects, all establish state-financed programs to compensate victims of crime. See Annot., Statutes Providing for Governmental Compensation for Victims of Crime, 20 A.L.R. 4th 63 (1983).
Under these statutes an agency or board is typically created to administer a state-financed fund. See § 24-4.1-117, C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 10A)(fund partially financed by costs levied on defendants convicted of certain crimes); see also 18 U.S.C. § 10601, et seq. (1986) (providing federal grants to state victim compensation programs). In order to receive compensation from such a fund, an eligible claimant, as defined under the statute, must generally prove that a "compensable crime" occurred that resulted in personal injury or death to a victim; however, neither a criminal prosecution nor conviction of the perpetrator of the criminal act underlying the claim is necessary for the grant of an award under these statutes.
While a claimant may be entitled to an award under these statutes, the award may not compensate for the actual loss caused by the crime. Uniformly, the statutes limit the dollar amount of an award. See § 24-4.1-109(1.5)(b), C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 10A) (limits residential
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