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Scoggins v. Unigard Insurance Co.12/31/1992
In this action for damages resulting from an auto accident, defendant, Unigard Insurance Company, appeals from a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff, Angelique Scoggins, finding Unigard obligated to pay benefits to Scoggins under the Auto Accident Reparations Act, ยง 10-9-701, et seq. (1987 Repl. Vol. 9A) (No-Fault Act). We reverse.
The following facts are undisputed. Scoggins was injured while riding as a passenger in an uninsured vehicle involved in a single vehicle accident in Colorado Springs. The owner and another passenger were killed.
The driver, Joseph Martinez, did not have an auto insurance policy of his own, but was listed as an additional insured on a policy issued to his parents by Unigard. That policy did not list the auto involved in this accident as an insured auto, and neither Scoggins nor the owner of the automobile involved in the accident was in any way related to Martinez' parents, a resident of their household, or a named insured under their policy.
Unigard acknowledged liability coverage for Martinez and paid Scoggins' liability claim. While Unigard acknowledged no-fault personal injury protection (PIP) for the driver, it denied PIP coverage on Scoggins.
Scoggins sued Martinez, the estate of the owner of the uninsured vehicle, and Unigard, alleging, inter alia, that Unigard had failed to provide PIP benefits. Unigard moved for summary judgment, seeking a determination that Unigard was not obligated to provide PIP benefits to Scoggins. Scoggins filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, requesting the court to order Unigard to provide her with PIP benefits.
Relying on Murphy v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 747 P.2d 691 (Colo. App. 1987), the court concluded that if Martinez was the operator he had a legally prescribed duty to be insured, but initially denied both motions after determining that a genuine issue of fact remained as to the operator of the vehicle. However, Unigard ultimately stipulated for the limited purposes of the PIP coverage determination that it did not dispute that Martinez was the driver, and the trial court then entered judgment in favor of Scoggins.
I.
Unigard asserts that Scoggins is not entitled to no-fault benefits under the policy. It further asserts that the language of the policy tracks the provisions of the No-Fault Act in defining the scope of individuals covered under its no-fault provisions. However, the provisions covering PIP benefits were not included in the appellate record. We are thus limited in our review to the policy and those references to the PIP endorsement contained in the record. We cannot conclude from those references, and Scoggins does not appear to contend, that the policy's scope of coverage is greater than that mandated by the No-Fault Act.
II.
A.
Unigard next asserts that Scoggins is not an insured entitled to PIP benefits under the provisions of the No-Fault Act. We agree.
In Murphy v. Dairyland Insurance Co., supra, the driver did not own any automobile; thus, there was no described automobile in the policy. The question was whether, in that situation, the policy provided PIP benefits to a passenger injured in an auto accident while the insured was driving. After noting that statutory PIP coverage for passengers extends only to injuries sustained while occupying a vehicle described in a complying policy, the court held that in order to be a "complying policy" under the No-Fault Act, an automobile insurance policy providing PIP coverage must describe one or more motor vehicles. If the insured owns no motor vehicles, the policy may designate as a described motor vehicle a
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